






Peter Merian-Weg 6 































 WWZ Working Paper 2021/02                               Kumar Rishabh, Jorma Schäublin  
 
A publication of the Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), University of Basel.  
 WWZ 2021 and the authors. Reproduction for other purposes than the personal use needs the permission of the authors. 
 
Payment Fintechs and Debt Enforcement
Kumar Rishabh† Jorma Schäublin‡
Abstract
Payment fintechs, acting as lenders, possess a potential solution to weak debt
enforcement because of their ability to deduct a part of a merchant’s digital sales
towards loan repayment. Analyzing payments processed by an Indian fintech
company offering sales-linked loans, we find that some borrowers discontinuously
reduce sales flowing through the company immediately after the loan disbursal to
circumvent repayment and strategically default. Using credit bureau scores sourced
independently and the spatial and temporal heterogeneity in cash availability
generated by a cash-crunch episode, we find that competition from other lenders
and cash limits the effectiveness of this enforcement technology.
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1 Introduction
Information asymmetry and limited enforcement create hurdles for firms wanting to access
credit. These problems are particularly severe for micro, small and medium enterprises
(MSMEs). Lenders find it hard to assess the creditworthiness of MSMEs owing to the lat-
ter’s small scale and opaque nature of business. Additionally, relatively small loan sizes and
slow judicial processes make it costlier for lenders to enforce payments from MSME borrowers,
and that fact deters lenders from serving MSMEs in the first place. These informational and
enforcement frictions result in severe credit constraints for MSMEs.1
Financial technology (fintech) is commended for its potential to alleviate the informational
frictions by making use of non-traditional data sources and models that help lenders screen
the borrowers better.2 In this paper, we analyze another potential advantage of fintech: the
mitigation of debt enforcement problems when the lender is also a fintech payment processing
company. Debt contract enforcement is woefully inefficient all over the world but especially so
in developing countries (Djankov et al., 2008). Figure A1 in Appendix A, based on data from
Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007), shows that developing countries like India (425 days)
and Brazil (566 days) take a long time to enforce unpaid debt contract through courts. Even
among developed economies, countries like the United States (250 days) and Germany (184
days) are quite slow compared to countries like Japan (60 days).
Payment fintechs are technology-based companies that process digital payments between
a merchant (seller or firm) and its customers (buyers).3 The payment company, thus, not
only observes revenue (from electronic payments) of the merchant but also sits between the
payments made by the customers and receipt of those payments by the merchant. Therefore,
if the payment company also acts as a lender to the merchant, the company can enforce
the repayment of the loan by taking a cut from the digital revenue stream of the borrowing
merchant. This gives the company ultimate seniority over the digital part of the merchant’s
income. This mechanism reduces the lender’s reliance on costly institutional enforcement of
credit contracts, such as through courts.
In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of this mechanism by studying the lending
program of a major Indian fintech payment company. The company lends to merchants who
use its point of sales (POS) machines for accepting digital payments. Repayment on loans is
sales4-linked. The company deducts a fixed proportion of each transaction it processes for the
1According to the World Bank, about 40% of MSMEs in developing countries are credit constrained,
with the credit deficit aggregating to about USD 5.2 trillion and amounting to 19% of their GDP (Bruhn
et al., 2017). According to Boata et al. (2019), the financing gap for SMEs is about EUR 400 billion in
the Eurozone, accounting for 3% of its GDP, while in the United States, the SME financing gap is about
2% of the GDP.
2See, for instance, Berg et al. (2020); Agarwal et al. (2021); Frost et al. (2019)
3Examples of such companies are PayPal and Square in the USA and Ant Financial in China.
4We use the term, transactions and sales to mean electronic transaction value and use these terms
interchangeably. Similarly, we mean electronic/digital transactions when we say transactions.
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borrowing merchant, towards the loan repayment. Using the loan-level and transaction-level
data, we find that borrowing merchants discontinuously drop their electronic sales immediately
after the loan disbursal. Given that this discontinuity is consistently observed over loans made at
different points of time, we associate this discontinuous fall in sales to manipulation (diversion
of sales) by the borrowing merchants. By persuading their customers to pay not by card
(using the lender’s POS) but with alternative means of payments (e.g. cash), a merchant can
circumvent the automatic repayment to the payment company. The possibility of manipulation
by diverting sales points to the limits of the automatic sales-linked enforcement mechanism.
The incidence of discontinuity presents interesting heterogeneities. First, this behavior
is exhibited by repeat borrowers and only in their second loan and subsequent loans. The
repeat borrowers, in their first loan or the non-repeat borrowers do not exhibit any suspicious
discontinuity post-disbursal. This indicates that there are some learning effects. Second,
only those repeat loans that go into default or in delay (together non-performing loans) show
a discontinuity on the disbursal day. Borrowers whose loans turn out performing show no
disbursal-day discontinuity. Because performing loans are not associated with any discontinuity,
we conclude that sales diversion post-disbursal may be used only to a limited extent to manage
short-term liquidity needs. The observed discontinuity in sales of the borrowing merchants
with non-performing loans indicate that there is a voluntary element in default. The default is
facilitated by the sales diversion away from the lending payment company’s POS device.
We use regression discontinuity (RD) design to quantify the drops in digital sales of the
borrowing merchants post-disbursal. Our RD estimates in a seven-day window around disbursal
suggest that non-performing borrowers in their repeat loan drop their sales, right after disbursal,
by about 18%, reducing the sales to about 17% below their long-term average daily sales. This
amount is an economically meaningful drop. Within the non-performing loans, the defaulting
borrowers show a higher drop in sales. Their sales drop by 20% immediately after loan disbursal.
Interestingly, defaulting loans also show higher-than-average sales pre-disbursal. Their sales are
about 5% higher than their long-term average on the eve of disbursal but fall to 16% below the
long-term average upon disbursal. The drop is also mirrored in the number of transactions: the
non-performing repeat borrowers divert about 11% of their transactions right after disbursal
compared to the pre-disbursal levels. These results hold in various longer bandwidths as well.
Our identification of sales diversion by the disbursal-day discontinuity is based on the
assumption that absent disbursal, all other changes in the sales will evolve smoothly around
the day of disbursal. To establish the soundness of this assumption, we essentially argue that
changes in sales due to other factors such as expected or unexpected shocks should smooth out
in aggregate. Therefore, these changes due to shocks will be captured in the slope terms of the
RD equation and not cause or influence the disbursal-day discontinuity. Given this, and the fact
that disbursal day is the first logical point to initiate diversion for the sales manipulators, we
infer that discontinuous drop in sales after disbursal must be a voluntary action to manipulate
sales to circumvent the automatic debt repayment.
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To see why shocks will not show up as discontinuity we consider the possibility of common
and idiosyncratic shocks. An explanation for discontinuity based on common shock would be
that at the time of loan disbursal, the borrowers might have coincidentally been hit by a shock
which would show up as discontinuity. However, this is ruled out given that the loan disbursals
were not concentrated in any period but rather spread over several months. Since, for our
analysis we pool loans disbursed at different dates, no common shock occurring on a date will
cause discontinuity.
Another alternative explanation would link discontinuity to the realization of some id-
iosyncratic expected or unexpected shock post-disbursal. The alternative explanation based
on expected shock would suggest that there is selection into loans based on anticipation of
shocks and borrowing merchants showing discontinuity is simply the result of the realization
of that expected shock immediately after disbursal. However, we argue that even with such
a selection, realized shocks will not cause discontinuity in the aggregate sales. It is because
borrowers cannot perfectly match the realization of the expected shock with the disbursal date.
This is because there is no perfect certainty about either the exact disbursal date or the exact
arrival date of the shock. The shock may arrive earlier or later than expected. In addition,
loans are disbursed by the payment company’s lending partner after the borrowing merchant
accepts the offer made by the payment company on behalf of its lending partner. This process
may take some time and makes it harder to predict the exact disbursal date. These factors
will lead to idiosyncratic mismatches between the disbursal date and the realization of the
shock—some borrowers will receive the shock before the loan disbursal, others will receive it
after the disbursal. This distribution of shock on both the sides of the disbursal day will smooth
out changes in aggregate sales around the loan disbursal. Similarly, any unexpected shock too
will be distributed smoothly around disbursal resulting in no discontinuity.5
Finally, note that beyond the disbursal day, the magnitude of diverted sales may increase
steadily over time. This could happen because the number of manipulators may increase
gradually or because the merchants learn to divert larger amount only gradually. In these cases
too the resulting changes in sales will be gradual and hence captured through the slope terms
and not the discontinuity. Thus, our estimates of diversion with disbursal-day discontinuity is
only a lower bound on the amount diverted.
We also relate sales manipulation to credit market competition. Theoretically, competition
weakens loan enforcement by creating enforcement externality as the existence of multiple
sources of funding diminishes the borrower’s value of a relationship with a lender and incen-
tivizes the borrower to default willfully (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).
Our setting allows us to study this relation. Owing to its exclusive reliance on historical sales
data, our payments company never used credit scores of the borrowers for making lending
decisions. It also did not report credit performance to any credit bureau. This setting, therefore,
provides us the unique opportunity to link sales diversion with the borrower’s outside options
5We will also provide empirical evidence supporting these arguments in Section 4.2.
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captured by the borrower’s credit score.
We divide our sample of borrowers into two groups based on the threshold level of credit
score that the credit market considers being the demarcation between high and low credit
quality. We also have a third category of borrowers–those with no credit history. We can think
of those borrowers with credit scores above the threshold as the ones having easy access to
credit outside of their credit relationship with the payment company. Therefore, such borrowers
are more likely to default willfully. In contrast, borrowers with a low credit score or no credit
history are less likely to default willfully. In line with this, we find that defaulting borrowers
who have credit scores above the threshold show very large disbursal-day discontinuity in
sales. On the eve of disbursal these defaulting merchants show sales approximately 25%
higher than their long-term average before disbursal and then reduce sales by approximately
40 percentage points immediately after the disbursal. Such large discontinuity points to a
diversion in sales and a voluntary default. The merchants with credit scores lower than the
threshold or merchants with no credit history do not show discontinuity when in default.
The evidence that borrowers can default by manipulating their sales implies that borrowers
can divert their sales away from the lending payment company’s system to some alternative
channel. In other words, the seniority of the payment company can be diluted due to the
competitive payment market–i.e., due to the competition faced by the electronic payment
company from cash, other payment technology or other payment companies. To answer whether
borrowing merchants divert their sales to cash or to other digital means, we use the exogenous
shock in availability of cash that occurred in March-April 2018 in certain regions of India. These
regions faced a temporary cash crunch as ATMs ran dry. A cash crunch makes it harder for
firms to persuade their customers to pay in cash. Therefore, if we observe that the borrowing
merchants display the same kind of sharp downward jump in digital sales in the crunch period
as they do in other periods, it would imply that merchants mainly use other digital means to
divert sales from their lender’s platform. We find that borrowers from districts affected by the
cash crunch show no significant discontinuity at disbursal in the cash crunch period, while they
show a significant drop in sales in the non-crunch period. Further, borrowers in non-crunch
districts always show a discontinuity, whether in the crunch period (when crunch districts were
affected) or non-crunch period. These results indicate that borrowers use cash, at least partly,
to divert sales.
Our results point out that even though payment company lending has the potential to
improve enforcement by making loan repayment automatic at source, it is not a foolproof
mechanism, yet. Its potential is evident from the fact that the payment company is able to lend
to MSMEs with no or limited credit history, that would find it extremely hard to access credit
otherwise. The limitations emanate from the existence of competing payment technologies
(including cash) that can be used to divert sales away from the lending payment company. Thus,
as long as debt enforcement institutions remain weak, and if economies rely predominantly
on cash, enforcement is going to be challenging. However, as economies digitize more rapidly
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with digital means of payment replacing cash, payment companies will be able to play a more
and more pivotal role in debt enforcement.
Literature: Our paper makes several contributions to three strands of literature on (i)
fintech lending, (ii) payment fintechs and, (iii) debt enforcement. Credit market outcomes are
determined by both pre- and post-contracting frictions. The current literature of fintech lending
has exclusively focused on fintech in the context of a pre-contracting friction – that is, how
fintechs can use alternative data to mitigate adverse selection problems. Some notable papers
in this theme include, Berg et al. (2020), Agarwal et al. (2021), Jagtiani and Lemieux (2019),
and Gambacorta et al. (2019). In contrast, our paper focuses on a post-contracting friction.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper that evaluates the potential advantage of
fintech in improving credit enforcement.
We also contribute to the new and emerging literature studying payment fintechs and their
lending business. Payment services is the first major part of the financial industry disrupted by
fintech (Bech and Hancock, 2020; Petralia et al., 2019; Philippon, 2016; Rysman and Schuh,
2017). As the next expansionary move, major fintech payment companies, across the world,
have started offering credit to merchants on their network. In the United States, Paypal and
Square are leading payment companies offering credit to MSMEs that use their payments
services or POS machines. Square has even acquired a banking license to grow its merchant
lending business.6
In line with general literature on fintech, research on payment fintechs has also so far
focused on pre-contracting informational frictions. For instance, Ghosh, Vallee and Zeng (2021)
study how lenders can use historical cashless payments data for loan underwriting. Using data
from an Indian lender that requires loan applicants to submit their historical bank statements,
the authors find that borrowers whose bank statements recorded more cashless transactions,
were more likely to be granted loans. In addition, such borrowers were also less likely to default.
Ghosh, Vallee and Zeng (2021) reinforce the point that electronic payments data contain useful
information for the lenders to screen the borrowers. Other related works in this area have
covered bigtech companies. Bigtechs are large technology companies that have a major non-
financial business, such as e-commerce platforms, but have ventured into payments and lending.
Examples of bigtech include Alibaba, Amazon and Mercado Libre.7 Frost et al. (2019) study
the ability of bigtech to use past sales data of MSMEs for credit screening. In contrast, we focus
on the post-contracting friction of weak enforcement and study the enforcement advantage of
the payment fintechs.
6Tyro payments in Australia also received a full banking license in 2016 with an authorization to
operate as a deposit-taking institution. In Europe, iZettle, a Swedish payment company in the lending
business, was acquired by PayPal in 2018. Among developing countries, other than the bigtechs in China,
the payment fintechs offering credit are the e-wallet company Paytm, the mobile-POS companies Mswipe
and PineLab in India, KopoKopo in Kenya, which lends to merchants accepting payments through Lipa
na M-Pesa, and iKhokha in South Africa.
7See BIS annual economic report 2019 for a discussion about bigtechs and their entry into the
payment and lending markets (BIS, 2019).
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That payments and lending share a close economic connection is not a recent idea. It goes
back to the checking account hypothesis in Black (1975), Fama (1985) and Nakamura (1993).
The hypothesis states that bank transaction accounts contain useful information about the
financial health of the borrowers. Therefore, banks could use that information to screen and
monitor the borrowers and take timely actions to mitigate loan losses. Recent studies have
empirically found evidence for this hypothesis in banks in various developed countries (Puri,
Rocholl and Steffen, 2017; Norden and Weber, 2010; Mester, Nakamura and Renault, 2007).
What is new in the wake of fintech innovation is that it has made payment services accessible to
MSMEs in the developing countries–with emphasis on the micro part of MSME. This has created
a possibility to financially include the unbanked or under-banked parts of the economy (BIS and
World Bank, 2020). Therefore, one contribution of our paper is to explore these fundamental
economic relationships which have been made possible in developing countries and in the
non-bank financial sector due to the technological innovation. We argue this relationship
between payment and credit intermediation goes beyond information value of transactions.
Transaction-linked repayment could prove to be another significant aspect of this relationship.8
It will be especially effective in contexts where loan contract enforcement through traditional
channels is costly–for example, in MSME lending and in economies with poor enforcement
institutions.9
Our final set of contributions relate to the literature on debt enforcement. Inefficient and
slow debt enforcement has a significant impact on the credit outcomes. When enforcement is
costly (in monetary or time units), the borrower may default voluntarily, anticipating that the
lender would not resort to formal measures of enforcement.10 Jappelli, Pagano and Bianco
(2005), use the variation in the enforceability of contracts across Italian regions, captured
by delays and backlogs in trials. They establish that lower enforceability of debt contract is
associated with lower availability of credit. In terms of contract features, studies have found
that better enforceability of contracts is associated with higher loan size, longer loan maturity,
lower cost of debt, lower reliance on trade credit, lower reliance on short-term debt and a lower
number of credit relationships for the borrowers (Bae and Goyal, 2009; Gopalan, Mukherjee
8An evidence for importance of this aspect is that the repayment rule adopted by the major payment
fintechs is sales-linked. For PayPal’s loan repayment policy, see https://www.paypal.com/workingca
pital/; for Square’s policy, see https://squareup.com/us/en/capital.
9In a more traditional lending market, generating seniority by linking transactions with repayment
has been experimented with under the name of asset-based lending . Asset-based lenders typically lend
by collateralizing the borrowing firm’s accounts receivable. The asset-based lender then gets access to
a specially created account in a bank where the borrower is expected to receive all their receivables.
However, it is readily inferred that this mechanism is costly because it requires, first, an assessment of the
value of the receivables pledged as collateral and then setting up a special account (Mester, Nakamura
and Renault, 2007; Berger and Udell, 2006). In the case of payment company lending, this repayment
design is nearly costless as it does not require any additional infrastructure other than what already
exists for their core payment business.
10See Ghosh, Mookherjee and Ray (2000) for an overview of theories relating limited enforcement and
credit rationing and Visaria (2009) and Gao et al. (2016) for empirical evidence connecting enforceability
and defaults.
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and Singh, 2016; Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee and Visaria, 2012; Qian and Strahan, 2007).
Incentives to strategically default in a weak judicial system could be mitigated by concerns
of loss in reputation or social sanctions (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999).11 This mechanism,
however, may be weakened in urban centers, especially when the lender is not located in the
same area. Another countervailing factor against strategic default is the lender’s threat to cut
future funding to the borrower (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Ghosh and Ray, 2016; Hoff and
Stiglitz, 1998).12 We contribute to this literature by studying another countervailing factor that
comes from the fintech lender’s seniority in the revenue stream.
Our final contribution is understanding the relation between competition and enforcement.
Hoff and Stiglitz (1998) theoretically predict that competitive credit market may raise borrwer’s
incentive to strategically default by weakening the countervailing forces. If a borrower has
many financing options, their reliance on one lender is smaller. The borrower may default on
one loan in the hope that they can access loans in the future from other lenders, especially if the
information sharing between lenders is imperfect. Thus, the presence of an additional lender
in the market creates an enforcement externality on other lenders. McIntosh, De Janvry and
Sadoulet (2005) test the predictions of Hoff and Stiglitz (1998) in a setting with group-liability
microfinance lending in Uganda. They study the impact of competition by group-level changes
in repayment rates and other outcomes subsequent to the entry of a competitor lender. They
find as groups acquired more choices with the higher number of lenders, their repayment
rates fell, although the groups did not drop out of the lender’s clientele. We contribute to this
literature, by comparing the behavior of the borrowers who have better access to the credit
market outside of their credit relationship with the payment company than to those who do not.
The novelty of our paper is that we can actually associate the act of default to strategic behavior
because we can study discontinuity in the merchants’ sales, and that informs us whether a
borrower defaults by manipulating sales. The setting in McIntosh, De Janvry and Sadoulet
(2005) does not allow to attribute changes in the repayment rates to strategic behavior of the
groups. Secondly, we observe defaults in individual loans that are not possible to observe in a
group-liability loan.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional set-up of the lending
program with sales-linked repayment. Section 3 explains the data and our empirical strategy.
Section 4 presents our results with visual and econometric evidence on discontinuity. Within
this section, results on enforcement challenges under a competitive debt market in Section 4.3
and from competitive payment technology in Section 4.4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
11One somewhat amusing example of such debt enforcement is the cobrador del frac–the debt collectors
in tailcoats and top hats–in Spain. These debt collectors try to enforce debt repayment from the defaulters
by shaming them publicly simply by appearing at the defaulter’s doorstep in their flamboyant dress
carrying a black briefcase with "debt collector" printed on it. See https://www.theguardian.com/bu
siness/2013/aug/09/spain-debt-collectors-cobrador-del-frac (accessed: May 28, 2021).
12Other substitutes that are used to a limited extent, for obvious reasons, are collateral and third-party
guarantees (Menkhoff, Neuberger and Rungruxsirivorn, 2012).
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2 Institutional set-up
Our collaborating fintech payment company is a major player in the Indian electronic payment
ecosystem. The company is a provider of mobile-POS machines mainly to MSMEs. India became
a fertile ground for the growth of payment fintechs after the government of India demonetized
the two largest rupee bills overnight on November 08, 2016.13 Crouzet, Gupta and Mezzanotti
(2019) find that the demonetization shock led to a persistent increase in electronic payments,
though the degree of persistence depended on the pre-demonetization level of adoption of
technology. Following this spurt in electronic payments, our collaborating company started its
lending program in the middle of 2017.
Our payment company in India had agreements with a number of lending companies that
are non-bank financial companies (NBFCs).14 However, one NBFC dominated the loan portfolio,
extending more than 80% of all the loans. All other lenders, individually accounting for a
small share of the loan portfolio, had made non-standardized, large-ticket-size loans to select
borrowers. We work with loans made by the largest lender. All the loans, like any typical
payment company loan, were unsecured.15
Figure 1 presents an example of a typical loan intermediated through a payment company
in comparison to traditional loans. In a traditional set-up, depicted in Figure 1a, the lender (say,
a bank or NBFC) gives the loan to the borrowing merchant directly. The loan is amortized over
the course of the tenure of the loan, through payments made by the borrower to the lender,
usually of a fixed amount and at fixed intervals (usually monthly frequency). So, a typical
uncollateralized bank loan is characterized by tenure and a repayment schedule outlining an
amount and a frequency of repayment. In this case, the lender only cares if the borrowing
merchant is current on the repayment schedule and does not observe the revenue flow of the
borrowing merchant. Also, the lender does not have control of whether the borrower uses the
sales revenue to meet expenses first before paying towards loan amortization.
In a typical payment company loan (POS loan), the company screens the merchants as
potential borrowers, based on the merchants’ historical transaction patterns. The company
provides information on the potential borrowers and their sales-related statistics to the lending
NBFC, which then decides whether to make an offer and the loan amount. Once the lender
approves a loan, the payment company makes a loan offer to the merchant outlining the loan
amount (principal), interest rate and a suggested tenure (more details about the loan terms are
13For a detailed account of the demonetization event and its effects on the Indian economy, see
Chodorow-Reich et al. (2020) and Lahiri (2020).
14NBFCs are financing companies that do not have a deposit franchise, barring a few that were allowed
to collect non-demandable deposits before 1997. The Reserve Bank of India has not given a deposit
franchise to any non-bank financial company since 1997. NBFCs are also not part of the payment and
settlement system. NBFCs are regulated and supervised by the Reserve Bank of India.
15There are several similarities in fintech payment company lending across different countries. Loans
are unsecured. Payment companies collaborate with licensed lenders to make loans, as most do not have
a banking license themselves.For instance, PayPal’s lending partner is WebBank and Square’s lending
partner, so far, is the Celtic Bank in Utah, in the United States.
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Figure 1: An Example of a Typical Lending Process Under Payments Company Loan
Program
(a) Traditional lending (b) Payment company lending
Example of a loan with a principal amount of INR 30,000. Loan, as in a typical payment company loan, is
unsecured. Neither lender nor the payment company can observe cash revenue (depicted as dotted line)
of the merchant. Payment company processes electronic (e.g. card) payments for the merchant. Bottom
panels show repayment of one instalment (out of possibly many) towards loan amortization under two
different lending arrangements. In the case of POS lending, the repayment is a fixed proportion (here
10%) of each card transaction processed through the payment company. Note the figure abstracts from
many real life details – for instance, it does not take into account processing fees charged by the payment
company on each transaction it processes.
discussed later). Once the merchant accepts the offer, the lender disburses the loan, sometimes
after some additional checks.
Figure 1b depicts a typical POS loan program. In contrast to traditional lending, under
payment-company lending, the loan is amortized by deducting a fixed percentage from each
electronic transaction processed by the company for the borrowing merchant. This ability to
deduct repayment from borrower’s sales creates a seniority for the lender in the revenue stream
of the borrowing merchant. Therefore, in contrast to a traditional credit relationship, under
POS lending, the borrowing merchant enjoys less discretion over repayment. In this paper, we
treat the payment company and lender as one entity as our focus is on the interaction between
the borrower on one side and the payment company plus the lender on the other.
An additional feature of this repayment mechanism, which is not studied in this paper but
is worth mentioning, is the inherent repayment flexibility to borrowers. Merchants do not
need to repay in a period when there are no sales. They can make up for lower repayments on
the days when the sales are higher. Repayment flexibility, in the context of microfinance, is
found to have positive effects on business investments and profitability and is associated with
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lower defaults rate if the borrowers have financial discipline (Barboni and Agarwal, 2018).16
These kinds of data-driven flexible loan repayment schemes are being adopted in other areas
as well. For example, Germany’s second-largest bank, Commerzbank, launched pay-per-use
loans17 where the repayment on loans for a manufacturing firm depends on the usage rate of
the machines in the firm.18
The loan amount is set by the lender based on their internal model and considers, among
other things, the value of transactions in the past months. Each loan has a two percent per
month interest charge, which is about the standard rate charged in NBFC lending to risky
borrowers in India and is in the range of interest rates charged by fintech lenders in the consumer
credit market in the US and the UK (Cornelli et al., 2020). Most loans have a suggested tenure
of 90 days. The lender introduced 180-day suggested tenure loans from August 2018 on. While
majority of the loans were 90-day suggested tenure, our data indicate that after the introduction
of the 180-day tenure loans, the lender suggested the latter mostly to repeat borrowers. The
tenures were only suggested as the loan repayment was sales linked, and there was no penalty
for late payment or for carrying forward the loan beyond its suggested due date.19
The deduction rate is set at 10%, i.e., 10% of each sale processed through the payment
company goes towards the repayment. The merchant receives the remaining 90% of the sales
(less any other charges, if any). However, merchants also have the option of repaying the loan
through direct transfers and closing the loan at any time, without any additional charges.20
The payment company/lender has not shared its internal screening criteria with us. How-
ever, it informed us that it based its credit decisions solely on the past transaction data. Specifi-
cally, the lender acquired but did not use credit scores at the time of making loan decisions
for its lending program in 2017 and 2018 (we test and confirm this claim in section 4.3). Our
lender’s reliance only on the past sales data is not an aberration. Both the United States-based
payment fintechs, Paypal and Square, also do not use credit scores to make lending decisions.21
16Also see Field et al. (2013) and Field and Pande (2008) for discussion about repayment flexibilities
relating to a delayed start in repayment and repayment frequency, respectively.
17The pay-per-use model is also employed in machinery leasing business, facilitated by the Internet of
Things that allows measuring the usage of leased products (Oliver Wyman, 2019).
18https://www.commerzbank.de/en/hauptnavigation/presse/pressemitteilungen/archiv1/
2018/quartal_18_02/presse_archiv_detail_18_02_75466.html(Accessed:May28,2021)
19For this reason, we define another concept of loan tenure for this study that we call implied tenure–the
number of days the borrower should take to repay the loan if post-disbursal sales are the same as the
long-term average sales pre-disbursal. We determine the delay in a loan repayment using this concept
of tenure. See Section 3 for more discussion.
20Some features of this contract are similar to the ones offered by U.S. payment companies. PayPal
also does not have a fixed loan tenure, but some minimum repayment needs to be maintained over a
period of time. Square has a suggested tenure of 18 months without any late fees but has the authority
to debit the Square-linked bank account of the borrower in case of delay. Both companies also allow
early repayment outside of the transaction processing channel. Both companies offer varying deduction
rates to different borrowers depending on the loan amount and sales history.
21For PayPal’s statement about credit scores, see https://www.paypal.com/workingcapital/faq
and for Square’s, see https://squareup.com/help/us/en/article/6531-your-credit-score-and
-square-capital-faqs. (Accessed: May 28, 2021).
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The lender acquired credit scores from one of the largest credit bureaus in India–TransUnion
CIBIL. The credit scores (also called CIBIL score) are the personal credit scores of the owners of
the borrowing MSME. The CIBIL credit score ranges between 300 and 900, with scores above
700 considered to be good in the credit market.
Figure 2 plots the distribution of credit scores of the borrowing merchants whose credit
history existed at the time of borrowing. It also plots, as a benchmark, the distribution of scores
that TransUnion CIBIL publishes (TransUnion CIBIL, 2017). The benchmark includes all types
of loans reported to the bureau by any financial institution. Because banks dominate the market
for credit, we can think of the benchmark distribution as the distribution of scores among bank
borrowers. The figure suggests that the fintech payment company mainly serves borrowers
with low credit scores who are unlikely to have access to credit from banks. For instance, the
median credit score for payment company loans is about 730, while for bank loans, it is above
800. Further, according to CIBIL, credit scores above 700 are considered good by the credit
market.22 Among the borrowers with credit scores, the fintech payment company made one in
three loans to borrowers with a score below 700. For banks, this number was about one in 10.
Further, about 10% of the loans by the payment company went to those borrowers who did not
have any credit history (no credit score).
Figure 2: Distribution of Borrower Credit Scores: Payments Company Versus Benchmark
Figure plots the distribution of credit scores of the merchants (business owners) who borrowed from the
payments company. For comparison, a benchmark distribution of scores for all the borrowers (taking any
type of loan: unsecured, secured, any maturity and so on) as reported by the credit bureau TransUnion
CIBIL, is also plotted. The benchmark distribution may be understood as a distribution of credit scores
for bank loans. Credit score ranges between 300 and 900, with higher score representing better credit
quality. Credit scores above 700 are considered good.




bureaus.23 Conventional credit reporting is based on the notion of monthly target repayment.
Payment company loans being sales-linked and flexible do not necessarily fit into that framework.
While the payment company can determine if the loan is non-performing (as we explain in
section 3.1), it can not benchmark repayment progress against any monthly target.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
Our fintech payment company provided us anonymous loan-level and transaction-level data.
The loan data provides, for each loan, the principal (loan amount), date of loan disbursal,
interest rate, suggested tenure, date when the loan was fully repaid (loan closure date), and
shortfall in the repaid amount compared to the amount owed, if any. We use the data on
shortfall to identify loans that went into default.
The company started its lending program in the middle of 2017. In the beginning, when
the lending program was in the pilot phase, the company experimented with different kinds
of loan policies before settling on a set of standard contract terms described in the previous
section. We, therefore, omit the data from the initial few months of the loan program and
include loans from October 2017 onward in our study. Within the standardized contracts, the
company offered a suggested tenure of 90 days for 81% of the loans and introduced 180-day
suggested tenure loans in August 2018 that accounted for the remaining 19% of the loans. We
include both types of loans in our analysis.
The anonymized transaction (card swipe) level data cover transactions for approximately
270,000 merchants (borrowing and non-borrowing) over the period from January 2015 to
February 2019. The data represent the universe of merchants using its POS system at that time.
For each transaction, we observe the transaction amount and transaction date. We also obtain
demographic information like industry and zip code (called PIN in India) for each merchant.
In total, we observe details for more than 99.4 million transactions. We use transaction data
for non-borrowing merchants for certain exercises. Because our transaction data run till the
end of February 2019 and we want to track the transaction activity of the borrowers for up to
three months after the loan disbursal, we restrict our analysis to loans made up to the end of
November 2018.
We also obtain the anonymized historical credit bureau scores from the lender. The lender
had not used the credit scores for the loans but had acquired them regardless. CIBIL score data
also identifies the borrowers who did not have a sufficiently long recent history to be assigned
a score. We call these loans unscored loans. We could not map about 18% of the loans in our
dataset with the bureau data from the lender. For this reason, the sample size for analysis
23See footnote 21 for links to the credit reporting policies of Square and PayPal.
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relating to credit scores is smaller than our overall sample. Out of the 82% of the loans that
could be mapped, about 10% loans were unscored.
We define different samples of borrowers. First is the sample of borrowers with non-
performing loans. Non-performing loans consists of essentially those loans that may have
incurred losses to the lender. These are loans that went into default or were late. To classify
loans into non-performing loans we use the update of the lender’s loan-book as on 31 December
2019—thirteen months after the disbursal of the last loan included in our analysis. This update
was a snapshot review of the asset quality (loan performances) in the long-run. We define
default loans as those loans that had a “large” shortfall (pending amount) as on 31 December
2019. We call a shortfall large if it is more than five percent of the due repayment amount as
on 31 December 2019.24
We label a loan as late if the borrower took at least 31 days longer than the tenure to
close (fully repay) the loan. As discussed earlier, due to being sales-linked, all the loans had a
suggested tenure and going beyond suggested tenure did not entail any penalty or late fees.
Therefore, to capture the idea of tenure better, we define a measure of tenure that we call
implied tenure. Implied tenure is the number of days that would be required to repay the loan
(loan amount plus interest amount), if the merchant continued to have same sales as their
pre-disbursal long-term average sales and given the lender deducted 10% of each sale towards
repayment. We define long-term average sales as the per-day average calculated over the 90-day
window consisting of sales in 30 days to 119 days before disbursal. We do not include the days
close to the disbursal date in average sales calculations because some short-term, unusually
high sales days that increase the probability of getting a loan might overstate the actual health
of the borrowers. In Appendix C.3 we perform robustness tests for our baseline results by
using different definitions of non-performing loans corresponding to different definitions of
delayed loans. We vary definition of delay on different dimensions such as (i) nature of tenure
(suggested vs. implied) and (ii) number of days-past-tenure (30 vs. 90). For our baseline case,
we call a loan late that fully pays-off but takes strictly more than 30 days than implied tenure
to do so.
We define performing loans as those that are not classified as non-performing (that is,
neither late nor default). For a quick reference, we summarize the sample definitions in Table
A1 in Appendix A.
A final consideration for our study is that we are careful not to include those loans of the
repeat borrowers in the analysis that were closed in proximity to the disbursal of their next
loan. The reason is that because of the sales-linked repayment, loans tend to close on the
days with extraordinary high sales. This means for the borrowers who took more than one
loan (repeat borrowers), due to this closure-day effect, data will show an unusually high sales
24A small proportion of the default loans were written-off by the lender and no longer followed up
due to merchant having left the payment company network. Majority of default loans were still being
pursued and were obviously much late beyond their (implied) tenure as on 31 December 2019.
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pre-disbursal on their next loan. It might also artificially heighten any discontinuity on these
repeat loans. Therefore, in all the analysis, we consider only those repeat loans that were
disbursed a certain amount of time after the closure of a previous loan. For instance, if we
analyze sales in a seven-day window around disbursal, we consider only those repeat loans
in the sample that were disbursed at least eight days after the closure of a previous loan by
the same borrower (in short, the closure gap is at least eight days). Thus, our sample changes
in accordance with the window we choose for our analysis. Therefore, our robustness checks
for alternative windows are also robustness checks on whether our results hold for different
samples. We use a seven-day window around disbursal for all the baseline regressions and
figures. Therefore, we present all our summary statistics for repeat loans with a closure gap of
at least eight days. For more discussion on this issue, see Section 3.2.
Tables 1 through 3 provide summary statistics on several loan-related variables for full sam-
ple, sample of one-time loan takers (non-repeat borrowers) and sample of repeat borrowers.25
The average loan made by the payment company is about INR 38,000, roughly about USD 570
in the nominal exchange rate or roughly about USD 1,900 in purchasing power parity exchange
rate. The average loan size and average implied tenure for a borrower increases on subsequent
loans. The interest rate charged on all loans is 2% per month, regardless of whether it is a first
or repeat loan. This appears to be a standard practice in other countries, too. In a seminal study,
Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that for the small businesses in the United States, the benefit of
the relationship accrues to the borrower through quantity and not price channels. In terms of
performance, out of 9,327 loans in our sample, we classify about 31% as non-performing (19%
as late, about 12% as default) and the remaining 69% as performing loans.
Of the 7,659 loans for which we could map the loan and credit scores data, we find that
10% of these loans went to borrowers without any credit history. This proportion is roughly the
same across non-repeat and repeat loans. The fact that a sizeable proportion of the payment
company’s clientele has no credit history suggests that fintech lenders are able to use other
economically relevant variables for credit assessment as a substitute for the credit history. Table
A3 in the appendix presents summary statistics over credit scores.
Our variable of interest to study transaction behavior is the daily sales at the merchant
level. To calculate that, we aggregate the swipe level data for each calendar day for each
merchant. Table 5 presents summary statistics on transaction-related variables for the borrowing
merchants. These statistics are mean values per-day-per-merchant calculated over different
windows. We also normalize the transaction variables for each merchant by their pre-disbursal
long-term averages. The pre-disbursal long-term averages are calculated in the same way as
we calculate the long-term averages when computing the implied tenure: the average per day
calculated over the 90-day window spanning 119 to 30 days before disbursal. We use the
normalized values of daily sales in our regressions.
25Table A2 in the Appendix presents summary statistics for loans according to month of disbursal of
the loans.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Loans: All Borrowers
No. Loans Mean Median SD p10 p90
Loan amount (INR1,000)a 9,327 38.07 25.00 38.39 10.00 83.00
Relationship length (months) 9,327 14.68 13.57 8.58 4.40 26.71
Suggested tenure (days) 9,327 106.90 90.00 35.15 90.00 180.00
Implied tenure (days) 9,327 141.97 110.18 171.50 55.35 229.86
Credit history exists (1 = Yes) 7,659 0.90 1.00 0.30 0.00 1.00
Credit score 6,886 713.88 727.00 53.63 639.00 773.00
Days past due (days)b 8,246 10.03 2.00 61.84 -54.00 79.00
Implied days past due (days)b 8,246 -17.69 -3.16 128.70 -93.77 59.40
Late (1 = Yes) 9,327 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00
Default (1 = Yes) 9,327 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00
Non-performing (1 = Yes) 9,327 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00
a INR 1,000 corresponds to approximately USD (PPP) 50, or approximately USD 15, as per 2017–2018
exchange rate series available on OECD.
b Among non-defaulting loans.
p10 and p90 refer to the 10th and 90th percentile respectively. Loan amount is the principal amount.
Relationship length is the number of months between the first ever transaction by the borrowing merchant
with the payments company and the loan disbursal date. All loans had suggested tenure of either 90
days or 180 days. Implied tenure is calculated taking into account historical average transaction value
of the merchant and the total amount owed (loan amount incl. interest). Given the 10% deduction rate
and their average past transaction value, it calculates how many days a borrower would take to repay
the loan. Credit history exists is a dummy that takes value 1, if the credit bureau assigns a credit score.
Credit scores range between 300 and 900, with higher scores indicating better borrower quality. For
loans for which the bureau indicated that no recent credit history existed at the time of the borrowing,
the dummy Credit history exists assigns a 0. Days past due is the difference between loan closure date
and suggested due date (= disbursal date + suggested tenure). Implied days past due is calculated as
the difference between the loan closure date and the implied due date (= date of disbursal + implied
tenure). Late is a binary variable that takes value 1, if a loan was non-defaulting and was repaid at least
30 days beyond the implied due date. Default is a binary variable that takes value 1, if the loan had
a shortfall > 5% of repayment amount and it was either written off or still pending as of end 2019.
Non-performing takes value 1 when either the loan is in default or is late. Loans were made between
October 2017 and November 2018. All the repeat loans included in the sample were disbursed at least
eight days after the closure of the preceding loan of the same borrower. For more details on the variables
see Table A1 in the appendix.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics on Loans: Non-repeat Borrowers
No. Loans Mean Median SD p10 p90
Loan amount (INR 1,000)a 2,152 38.51 22.00 42.65 9.00 94.00
Relationship length (months) 2,152 12.69 11.22 8.25 3.84 23.01
Suggested tenure (days) 2,152 91.00 90.00 9.45 90.00 90.00
Implied tenure (days) 2,152 118.77 101.06 168.96 55.86 176.44
Credit history exists (1 = Yes) 1,711 0.90 1.00 0.30 0.00 1.00
Credit score 1535 717.86 730.00 53.69 641.00 775.00
Days past due (days)b 1,578 30.62 10.00 67.77 -31.00 119.70
Implied days past due (days)b 1,578 9.93 4.09 92.56 -59.75 103.10
Late (1 = Yes) 2,152 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00
Default (1 = Yes) 2,152 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00
Non-performing (1 = Yes) 2,152 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
a INR 1,000 corresponds to approximately USD (PPP) 50, or approximately USD 15, as per 2017–2018
exchange rate series available on OECD.
b Among non-defaulting loans.
Non-repeat borrowers are those that took only one loan in the period until February 2019. See Table 1
for notes and for more details on the variables see Table A1 in the appendix.
An average borrowing merchant receives about INR 3,980 per day through electronic means
from customers. The merchant experiences an uptick in sales before disbursal, as evident from
the fact that the merchants’ short-term average sales are about 5% higher than their long-term
average pre-disbursal. The sales, however, decline in the post-disbursal period. The decline
is quite substantial for non-repeat borrowers. This decline is partly due to selection: many
non-repeat borrowers are non-repeat because of their poor performance on their loan. Post-
disbursal, the average borrower transacts slightly more than its long-term average pre-disbursal.
This increase suggests that the lending program, on average, is successful in helping merchants
maintain their long-term sales, if not at higher levels. Payment companies offer the lending
program not just to earn interest income but also to incentivize merchants to transact more,
as higher sales increase the lender’s income from the proportional transaction charges on
transactions and also keep the merchant engaged to the lender’s network. However, clearly,
there are also non-performing borrowers on whom the payment company loses money because
the borrower reduces sales post-disbursal. Summary statistics over loan status in Table A4 in
the Appendix A shows that merchants with non-performing loans reduce their sales drastically
after disbursal. In what follows, we study the nature of this reduction.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
We study the borrowing merchants’ sales behavior around the day of disbursal. More specifically,
we want to understand whether merchants discontinuously alter their sales immediately after
loan disbursal. The idea is that a discontinuous change in POS sales on the disbursal date
indicates a voluntary action of the borrower to influence sales in response to the disbursal. We
expect to find discontinuity on the day of disbursal because, for manipulators, it is the first
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Table 3: Summary Statistics on Loans: Repeat Borrowers
No. Loans Mean Median SD p10 p90
Loan amount (INR 1,000)a 3,207 30.36 20.00 31.76 8.00 64.00
Relationship length (months) 3,207 12.30 10.74 8.10 3.75 22.97
Suggested tenure (days) 3,207 90.14 90.00 3.55 90.00 90.00
Implied tenure (days) 3,207 102.15 95.18 66.33 47.77 156.71
Credit history exists (1 = Yes) 2,626 0.89 1.00 0.32 0.00 1.00
Credit score 2,329 712.07 724.00 54.41 636.00 772.00
Days past due (days)b 3,207 6.18 2.00 33.47 -35.00 51.00
Implied days past due (days)b 3,207 -5.82 -0.06 67.24 -60.37 47.78
Late (1 = Yes) 3,207 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00
Default (1 = Yes) 3,207 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Non-performing (1 = Yes) 3,207 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00
(a) 1st Loan
No. Loans Mean Median SD p10 p90
Loan amount (INR 1,000)a 3,968 44.07 30.00 39.74 14.00 93.00
Relationship length (months) 3,968 17.68 16.39 8.22 8.05 29.90
Suggested tenure (days) 3,968 129.06 90.00 44.61 90.00 180.00
Implied tenure (days) 3,968 186.74 141.65 215.72 63.86 314.76
Credit history exists (1 = Yes) 3,322 0.91 1.00 0.29 1.00 1.00
Credit score 3,022 713.25 727.00 52.90 639.00 771.00
Days past due (days)b 3,461 4.20 -1.00 75.76 -85.40 98.00
Implied days past due (days)b 3,461 -41.29 -12.27 174.19 -150.58 61.42
Late (1 = Yes) 3,968 0.18 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00
Default (1 = Yes) 3,968 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00
Non-performing (1 = Yes) 3,968 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00
(b) Repeat Loan
a INR 1,000 corresponds to approximately USD (PPP) 50, or approximately USD 15, as per 2017–
2018 exchange rate series available on OECD.
b Among non-defaulting loans.
Repeat borrowers are those that took more than one loan in the period under study. Repeat loan
refers to second and subsequent loans of the repeat borrowers. All the repeat loans included in
the sample were disbursed at least eight days after the closure of the preceding loan of the same
borrower. See Table 1 for notes and for more details on the variables see Table A1 in the appendix.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics on Transactions Around Loan Disbursal
Mean values (except number of loans)
Transactions Normalized Transactions
All Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers All Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers
Brwrs. Brwrs. 1st Loan Rep. Loan Brwrs. Brwrs. 1st Loan Rep. Loan
Transaction valuea
180-day window 3.87 4.03 3.83 3.82 1.04 0.92 1.10 1.05
−7 to −1 days 4.04 4.39 3.76 4.08 1.10 1.05 1.11 1.12
0 to 7 days 3.91 4.17 3.82 3.85 1.04 0.93 1.09 1.06
Pre-disbursal long-term 3.98 4.71 3.70 3.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Pre-disbursal short-term 4.14 4.79 3.82 4.03 1.06 1.05 1.07 1.06
Post-disbursal 3.61 3.26 3.84 3.61 1.01 0.79 1.14 1.04
Number of transactions
180-day window 2.77 2.54 3.06 2.66 1.02 0.92 1.08 1.02
−7 to −1 days 2.80 2.69 2.99 2.70 1.04 0.97 1.06 1.06
0 to 7 days 2.78 2.55 3.07 2.68 1.02 0.93 1.06 1.04
Pre-disbursal long-term 2.77 2.82 2.88 2.66 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Pre-disbursal short-term 2.85 2.87 2.99 2.72 1.04 1.02 1.05 1.03
Post-disbursal 2.70 2.22 3.14 2.60 1.00 0.81 1.10 1.01
Number of loans 9,327 2,152 3,207 3,968 9,327 2,152 3,207 3,968
a Non-normalized transaction values are in thousand INR. INR 1,000 correspond to approximately USD
(PPP) 50, or USD 15, as per 2017–2018 exchange rate series available on OECD.
All values, except for number of loans, are average per day per borrowing merchant calculated over
different windows. 180-day window is centred at the disbursal date and covers 90 days prior and 90
days after disbursal inlcuding the day of disbursal. Day 0 refers to the disbursal date. Days with a minus
sign are days prior to disbursal. Pre-disbursal long-term period refers to the 90-day period between days
-119 and -30. It aims to capture the average sales away from the disbursal date. Pre-disbursal short-term
period refers to the 90-day period between days -90 and -1 and is considered short term for including
days shortly before the disbursal. Post-disbursal refers to the 90-day window between day 0 and day 89.
We normalize the transaction value and number of transactions for each merchant by their respective
averages calculated in the pre-disbursal long-term period respectively.
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logical day to initiate diversion.
Our identifying assumption is that in the absence of any voluntary diversion, any other
change in sales will evolve smoothly around the disbursal day. To see why we expect this
assumption to be true, let us ask which other factors might potentially cause discontinuity.
One might contend that discontinuity on the disbursal day could be caused by realization
of expected or unexpected shocks after disbursal. However, we argue that these shocks are
unlikely to cause discontinuity. The idea is that idiosyncratic shocks across borrowers realize
independently over different days around the disbursal date and therefore will not cause any
discontinuity in aggregate. It is easy to see that this will be the case for unexpected idiosyncratic
shocks that arise independently across borrowers. Even in the case where borrowers take
loans in anticipation of negative shocks, we argue that discontinuities are implausible. It is
because of two reasons. First, merchants cannot perfectly predict the disbursal date, as once
they accept the loan offer from the payment company, the final disbursal is done by the lending
partner of the payment company. Second, there will usually be an error between expectation
and realization of the shock—the shock may arrive earlier or later than expected. Because
these errors between actual shocks and loan disbursal will be idiosyncratic, the shocks even if
anticipated, will be spread around the disbursal date negating any discontinuity in the aggregate
sales. Finally, given that our analysis pools loans made at different dates spread over a period of
13 months, we can also exclude the influence of any common shock affecting all the borrowers
at the same time. We provide detailed evidence ruling out these alternative explanations in
Section 4.2.
To measure the discontinuity in borrower sales on the day of disbursal, we apply the
regression discontinuity (RD) approach, with the days since disbursal (denoted as “day”) as
the running variable. For the loan i and transaction date t, days since disbursal is defined
as dayi,t := t − disbursali, where disbursali is disbursal date for the loan i. This implies
day = 0 for the disbursal date, day < 0 for days before disbursal, and day > 0 for days after
disbursal. Our dependent variable is esalesi,t which is the digitally processed transactions on
date t for the merchant who borrows loan i. For most of our analysis, we use the normalized
daily value of transactions as our relevant esalesi,t variable. We also use the normalized daily
number of transactions for some other specifications.
We run polynomial regressions that fit, in narrow bands around the cut-off, a polynomial
each on the left and the right of the cut-off, which in our case is the disbursal day, day = 0.
Then intuitively, discontinuity is reflected in the difference in the values the regression functions
take at the cut-off. We denote the length of the bandwidth as h.26 More generally, a regression
that fits polynomials in a bandwidth of size h uses data between day = −h and day = h . When
we set h to a small value (for instance, h= 7) in a regression we call it a local regression.
The idea of comparing the values of two polynomial fits at the cut-off point can be imple-
mented through one regression by including dummy variables for post-disbursal days. More
26We use the terms bandwidth and window interchangeably.
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precisely, for a local comparison, we regress, in a window h around the disbursal date, the
transaction variable of interest, esalesi,t , on a polynomial of dayi,t allowing for different
slopes, and different polynomial degrees (p,q) before and after loan disbursal. Formally, we




























Where T is the set of transaction dates. Di,t := 1{dayi,t ≥ 0} is a dummy variable that is 1 when
dayi,t ≥ 0 (post-disbursal), and 0 otherwise. Di,t × (dayi,t)s is the interaction term between
Di,t and the sth polynomial term of dayi,t . Similarly, (1−Di,t)× (dayi,t)s is the interaction term
between 1−Di,t and the sth polynomial term of dayi,t . We assign equal weights to observations
(i.e., use a box kernel) for all our RD regressions. Note that the coefficient τ gives us the
measure of discontinuity in esales at the cut-off day, in this case disbursal day (at day= 0).
The intercept α gives us an estimate for the counterfactual esales at day= 0. Our dependent
variable, esalesi,t , is sales normalized by long-term pre-disbursal sales, therefore, τ represents
the change in sales in percentage points of the average long-term pre-disbursal sales.
The selection of the bandwidth h creates a trade-off between bias and precision (Imbens
and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). A wider bandwidth allows including more data
points, farther away from the cut-off. More data points may help us capture non-linearities
in the data more precisely by allowing for fitting a high order polynomial. However, as we
include more data away from the cut-off, we run the risk of including the effects of other
events taking place away from the cut-off (see e.g., Hausman and Rapson, 2018). Moreover,
as discussed earlier, exceptional sales days that close the preceding loan may accentuate the
discontinuity for the following loan. For this reason, we only include those repeat loans in any
analysis that were disbursed more than h days after the closure of the borrower’s preceding
loan. This allows us to shut the effects of exceptional closure day sales, if any, in the bandwidth
of analysis. When we apply a wider estimation window, this exclusion criterion, excludes more
repeat loans but has more observations on transactions per loan. For these considerations, we
select a narrow bandwidth of h= 7 for all baseline local regressions and figures. Keeping up
with the good practice suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010), we cross-validate our findings
using wider bandwidths as well. For most of our results, we report local regressions with a
narrow bandwidth (h = 7), as well as the widest bandwidth of h = 90 at the other extreme.
We also report results with some other intermediate bandwidths for the baseline case. Readers
may ask us for regression results for those specifications not reported in the paper.
Following the suggestions of Hausman and Rapson (2018), we select the number of
polynomial terms to the left (p) and to the right (q) of the cut-off based on the Bayesian
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information criterion (BIC). The BIC captures a trade-off between precision and the number
of estimated parameters. We select the specification with the lowest BIC from a grid search
across all combinations of p and q, allowing a maximum order of 7. The BIC selection criteria
suggests p = q = 1 regardless of the sample, for any local regression with a bandwidth of h = 7.
Essentially, that means we run a local linear regression every time. When cross-validating with
wider bandwidths, the BIC selection criterion does not choose a polynomial fit with an order
higher than 3 for any sample or bandwidth. For inference, throughout our analysis, we apply
standard errors clustered over loans, i.
We run the RD regressions separately for different samples of borrowers. In particular we
compare performing loans with non-performing loans of the non-repeat and repeat borrowers.
We should note a few points about the size of the estimated discontinuity. First, post-
disbursal, it is possible that the degree of diversion rises gradually over time due to higher
diverted amount and higher number of manipulators. Any gradual change in diversion will
also be captured in the polynomial terms and not as the discontinuity estimate. Therefore, the
amount estimated as discontinuity is only a lower bound on the amount of diversion. Second,
should we be concerned that even if shocks do not cause discontinuity, they might heighten the
size of discontinuity, especially if we condition our sample on non-performance? If so, then
even if we identify the cause of disbursal-day discontinuity correctly as sales diversion, we
might still overstate the amount of discontinuity. We do not believe this to be the case. It is
true that non-performance may result not just because of voluntary diversion but also due to
a permanent shock to a merchant’s sales. However, as argued above, one would expect the
distribution of these shocks to be spread across days around disbursal and not to be concentrated
on any specific day. Given the spread-out shocks, the cumulative sum of loans that have such
a permanent sales shock would increase steadily post-disbursal. This would result in only a
smooth decline in sales. These smooth changes will be captured in the slope terms of the
regression equation and not influence the discontinuity estimates. We provide more evidence
on this in Section 4.2.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline Visual Evidence and Regression Estimates
In the figures that follow we plot the digital sales of the borrowing merchant against days
since disbursal (day), in a 7-day window around loan disbursal. Negative days since disbursal
(day< 0) indicate days before disbursal and day= 0 is the disbursal day. The points on these
figures represent the mean digital sales per merchant and the solid lines are the fit estimated
from the local linear regression (i.e., selected polynomial degrees p = q = 1) as described in
Equation 1 with variable day as the running variable.
Our first result is that experienced borrowers manipulate sales. We find that disbursal-day
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discontinuity is a phenomenon exclusively associated with repeat loans of the repeat borrowers.
One-time borrowers (non-repeat borrowers) and the repeat borrowers in their first loan do
not show any suspicious behavior around disbursal. Second, this discontinuous fall in sales
post-disbursal is led by loans that became non-performing (delayed or in default). Borrowers
with performing loans do not show any discontinuous fall in sales after disbursal.
We can see these heterogeneities from Figure 3 and Figure 4. Figure 3 compares the
borrower sales corresponding to non-performing loans with those corresponding to performing
loans for the repeat borrowers. We see that non-performing borrowers show discontinuity but
only on their second and subsequent loans. Remember that non-performing loans are those
loans that either went into default or were delayed 30 days beyond their implied due date.
Because a defaulting borrower does not receive another loan, all the non-performing first loans
of the repeat borrowers are basically loans that were late. The regression results for different
samples that feature in these figures are given in Table 6.
Figure 4 and the corresponding regression results in Table 6 establish that non-repeat
borrowers also do not seem to divert sales. Taken together with the evidence in the previous
paragrpah, this points to some learning effects. It appears merchants learn through their
experience over loans that they could manipulate their sales to evade loan enforcement. Fink,
Jack and Masiye (2020) also find similar results in the context of micro consumption loans
in rural Zambia, where borrowers showed much lower repayment rates on their repeat loans
due to borrowers gaining the insight that the lender had limited power to enforce loans.
A rather striking difference between the non-repeat borrowers and the repeat borrowers is
apparent when we compare defaulting loans among them. In Figure 5 and corresponding
regressions in Tables 6 and 7 we see that non-repeat defaulting borrowers not only don’t
show any discontinuity they also show a decreasing trend in sales before-disbursal. Quite
distinctively, repeat defaulting borrowers show a healthy picture on the eve of disbursal but a
sharp discontinuity on the day of disbursal.
Because the sales are normalized by the merchant’s long-term average sales, the value
of transactions bigger than one implies that the merchant’s sales are above the long-term
average. Further, the estimate for discontinuity gives us the change in sales relative to that
average. Thus, the estimated discontinuity in the regression results reflects the change in
sales in percentage points of average sales. Keeping these in mind, we observe from Table 6
that borrowers, on average, drop their sales by about 18 percentage points right after loan
disbursal on repeat loans that end as non-performing loans. This drop corresponds to 17.8% of
the counterfactual sales on disbursal date, given by the intercept. The drop is economically
significant not only for the large drop but also because it pushes down the sales from above the
long-term average pre-disbursal to below the long-term average post-disbursal. Instantly after
disbursal, sales plummet to about 17% below the long-term average. We also run a similar
regression as in Table 6, but with daily number of transactions as the dependent variable. We
find a similar discontinuous drop in the number of transactions for non-performing loans. From
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Figure 3: Repeat Borrowers – Normalized Transaction Value Pre- and Post- Disbursal
Performing Loans, Repeat Borrowers
(a) 1st Loan (b) Repeat Loan
Non-performing Loans, Repeat Borrowers
(c) 1st Loan (d) Repeat Loan
Points on the graphs represent the mean of the normalized daily transaction values over merchants.
Daily transaction values are normalized by the merchant’s average daily transaction value calculated in
the 90-day period between 119 days and 30 days before loan disbursal (pre-disbursal long-term average
sales). On the horizontal axis, 0 represents the day of disbursal and negative integers refer to days
before disbursal and positive integers refer to days after disbursal. Solid lines represent the fit by a
local regression for a 7-day window around disbursal. Dashed lines show 90% confidence interval
using standard errors clustered by loan. Dashed vertical line shows date of loan disbursal. n in the
legend refers to number of loans (number of borrowers). Repeat borrowers are merchants who took
at least two loans from the lender. Repeat loans include second and subsequent loans. Only those
repeat loans are considered that were disbursed more than 7 days after the closure of the preceding
loan of the borrower. Non-performing loans are either defaulting or late loans. All samples include
loans disbursed between October 2017 and November 2018, and with 90-day or 180-day suggested
maturity. For detailed definitions of samples see Table A1.
the regression results in Table A5 in Appendix A, the drop is about 11 percentage points in
the number of transactions, as against the 18 percentage point in the value of transactions,
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Figure 4: Non-repeat Borrowers – Normalized Transaction Value Pre- and Post- Disbursal
(a) Performing Loans (b) Non-performing Loans
Non-repeat borrowers are those that borrowed only once until Feb 2019. Non-performing loans are
either defaulting or late loans. Performing loans are those that are not non-performing. n in the legend
refers to number of loans (number of borrowers). For more details see notes for Figure 3 and for detailed
definitions of samples see Table A1.
Figure 5: Default Loans – Normalized Transaction Value Pre- and Post- Disbursal
(a) Non-Repeat Borrowers (b) Repeat Borrowers, Repeat Loan
Default loans are loans that had a shortfall > 5% of repayment amount and were either written off
or still pending as of end 2019. For more details see notes for Figure 3 and for detailed definitions of
samples see Table A1.
implying that merchants divert high-value transactions first. When looking at the defaulting
borrowers within the non-performing loans in Table 7, we find that they show a higher drop in
sales than the average non-performing borrower does. Their sales drop by 20% compared to
the counterfactual sales. Strikingly, just before disbursal, defaulting borrowers also show 5%
higher (counterfactual) sales than pre-disbursal-long-term average. Immediately after disbursal,
the defaulting borrowers divert their sales to bring sales 16% lower than the pre-disbursal
long-term average.
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Table 6: Local Linear Regression – Performing vs. Non-Performing Loans
Dependent Variable: Normalized Daily Transaction Value
All Performing Loans Non-performing Loans
Brwrs. Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers
& Loans Brwrs. 1st Loan Rep. Loan Brwrs. 1st Loan Rep. Loan
Intercept 1.05*** 1.01*** 1.17*** 1.16*** 0.72*** 0.80*** 1.01***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
(1−D)× day -0.01** -0.05*** -1.1E-03 -0.01 0.04*** -7.0E-03 0.02
(4.8E-03) (0.02) (9.1E-03) (9.0E-03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Discontinuity, D 4.5E-03 0.18*** -0.06 0.04 0.09 0.04 -0.18***
(0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
D× day -5.1E-03 -0.03** 0.01* -7.0E-03 -0.02* -0.01 -4.2E-03
(3.6E-03) (0.01) (7.0E-03) (7.5E-03) (9.3E-03) (0.01) (9.1E-03)
No. Loans 9,327 1,112 2,594 2,752 1,040 613 1,216
No. Obs. 139,905 16,680 38,910 41,280 15,600 9,195 18,240
R2 0.02% 0.14% 0.01% 0.01% 0.24% 0.02% 0.10%
R̄2 0.02% 0.11% -0.00% 0.00% 0.22% -0.02% 0.08%
Bandwidth (h) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Cutoff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Results from local regression of merchants’ normalized daily transaction value as dependent variable.
Daily transaction values are normalized by the merchant’s average daily transaction value calculated in
the 90-day period between 119 days and 30 days before loan disbursal (pre-disbursal long-term average
sales). Regression uses the number of days since loan disbursal (day) as running variable. The day
number is centred around day of loan disbursal, such that day= 0 for disbursal date and day> 0 for
days after disbursal, and negative otherwise. D is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if day≥ 0 and 0
otherwise. Repeat borrowers are merchants who took at least two loans from the lender. Repeat loans
include second and subsequent loans. Only those repeat loans are considered that were disbursed more
than 7 days after the closure of the preceding loan of the borrower. Non-performing loans are either
defaulting or late loans. For detailed definitions of samples see Table A1. All samples include loans
disbursed between October 2017 and November 2018, and with 90-day or 180-day suggested maturity.
Standard errors are clustered by loan and given in parentheses. Local regression is performed using a
box kernel, over a 7 day bandwidth.
Significance: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
We also note that performing loans of the non-repeat borrowers show a significant positive
jump in sales post-disbursal. However, this result is not robust to alternative bandwidths as
the estimate of discontinuity becomes insignificant and even negative for larger bandwidths as
shown in Tables C8 through C10 in Appendix C.
We can also use the heterogeneous responses of borrowers to disbursal to understand the
motives behind sales diversion. Merchants could divert sales briefly post-disbursal to minimize
immediate deductions going towards repayment to maximize the liquidity available to them. In
such a scenario, merchants may make up for the diverted loan repayments by increasing their
sales later or by paying the lender directly, without being delayed (non-performing). Moreover,
if the merchant reduces sales only for a few days, then in the absence of any additional actions
described above, loan repayment may get delayed only by a few days. Even then, as long as
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Table 7: Local Linear Regression – Late and Default Loans
Dependent Variable: Normalized Daily Transaction Value
Late Loans
Non-repeat Repeat Borrowers Default Loans
Brwrs. 1st Loan Repeat Loan Non-rep Brwrs. Repeat Loan
Intercept 0.73*** 0.80*** 0.99*** 0.71*** 1.05***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
(1−D)× day -0.04* -7.0E-03 0.02 -0.05** 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Discontinuity, D 0.16 0.04 -0.17* 0.03 -0.21*
(0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12)
D× day -0.03** -0.01 -0.01 -7.7E-03 1.0E-02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
No. Loans 467 613 710 573 506
No. Obs. 7,005 9,195 10,650 8595 7,590
R2 0.18% 0.02% 0.16% 0.34% 0.07%
R̄2 0.12% -0.02% 0.12% 0.30% 0.02%
Bandwidth (h) 7 7 7 7 7
Cutoff 0 0 0 0 0
Late loans are those non-defaulting loans that took more than 30 days than the implied tenure to fully
repay the loan. Implied tenure is the number of days in which the loan should have been fully repaid
if the borrowing merchant in the post disbursal period continued his pre-disbursal long term average
sales. Default loans are loans that had a shortfall > 5% of repayment amount and were either written
off or still pending as of end 2019. For detailed definitions of samples see Table A1. For detailed notes
on regressions see Table 6.
Significance: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
the loan is late only by up to 30 days, such a loan will be labelled performing by our criteria.
Therefore, if diversion for short-term liquidity management is the motive, we will observe
discontinuity in sales for the borrowers with performing loans as well. Further, the discontinuity
should be especially pronounced in repeat performing loans if we expect merchants to learn
from their borrowing experience how to steer their sales to manage liquidity. However, our
results do not support evidence for such a motive. We do not observe any discontinuous fall in
sales associated with either first or repeat performing loans (Table 6). In the larger bandwidths,
sometimes we do observe a negative estimate of discontinuity for performing loans, but it is
not robust across different bandwidths (Tables C8–C10).
Alternatively, merchants may divert sales with the intention to voluntarily default. Our
evidence of discontinuity for non-performing borrowers is consistent with this explanation.
The discontinuity for non-performing repeat borrowers is robust to alternative bandwidths as
shown in Appendix C.1. In Appendix C.2 we test the robustness of this result to months of
disbursal by running regressions excluding one month at a time. We find that these results are
robust across all the months. We also test the robustness by controlling for weekly seasonal
effects following the procdure in Hausman and Rapson (2018) in Appendix C.4. To do that,
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we first obtain residuals from a regression of esalesi t against day-of-the-week dummies. As a
next step, we use these residuals as explanatory variable in estimating regression equation (1).
The estimates of discontinuity with residuals are pretty close to the baseline case.
Finally, we do a robustness test with alternative definitions of non-performance correspond-
ing to different definitions of late loans in Appendix C.3. The estimates of discontinuity for
the following repeat-loan samples are reported in Table C12: (i) Non-performing loans (ii)
Late loans (iii) Performing Loans. These three samples are the ones affected by change in
the definition of late loans. In these robustness tests, the set of default loans, which is also a
component of non-performing loans, does not vary. We make the following observations from
this exercise. First, the results relating to non-performing loans are robust across different
definitions of delay. Second, the result about absence of discontinuity for the repeat performing
loans does not change either. Third, late loans, that form a part of non-performing loans,
show large and significant discontinuity when we define tenure as implied tenure and set the
threshold of 30 days-past-tenure for calling the loan late. However, when considering suggested
tenure or when choosing a threshold of 90 days-past-tenure, the estimate of discontinuity are
numerically large but not precisely estimated.
For the remaining analysis, we prefer our baseline measure of late (30 days past tenure) and
employ that to define non-performing loans for the following reasons. First, when repayment
is sales-linked and does not entail late fees going beyond suggested tenure, implied tenure is a
more natural way to think about tenure. Second, given the flexible nature of repayment we
only care if the loan was repaid by the end of the tenure and not how it progressed within the
tenure. Therefore, a more strict criteria that applies 30 days beyond tenure is preferable over
90 days beyond tenure.
In summary, the main conclusion of this section is that the existence of discontinuity and
the nature of discontinuity points to merchants manipulating their sales to voluntarily default.
This result casts a shadow over the effectiveness of the payment company enforcement and
brings to the fore the issue of strategic default in an environment with weak enforcement.
4.2 Discussion: Discontinuity and Sales Diversion
In this section we elaborate on our arguments about identifying sales diversion by the disbursal-
day discontinuity in borrower sales. We establish the identification in two steps. First, we
explain why sales diversion may show up as discontinuity on the day of loan disbursal. Second,
we argue, absent diversion, sales will not change discontinuously at the disbursal day since
other factors evolve smoothly around the disbursal. Any smooth changes around disbursal are
captured in the polynomial terms (slope terms) and do not impact the discontinuity estimates
at disbursal day. It is straightforward to see why sales diversion may cause a disbursal-day
discontinuity. Disbursal day is the first opportunity for a borrower to divert sales to avoid
repayment. Note that if there is an element in sales diversion that changes only gradually over
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time—for instance because number of manipulators increases smoothly or because manipulators
only learn gradually how to divert sales—then that part of diverted sales will also be captured
by the slope terms and not show up as discontinuity. Therefore, our estimate of diversion is a
lower bound.
Factors other than intentional manipulation that may potentially cause a discontinuity
at disbursal date include unexpected or expected idiosyncratic shocks coinciding with loan
disbursal. One may argue these factors may be a threat to identification especially if we
condition our loan samples on ex-post measures like non-performance. The contention would be
that shocks that cause a loan to go into non-performance would also show up as discontinuity.
However, we argue in Section 3.2 that these shocks should be spread around the day of disbursal.
The spread of the shocks would result in a continuous smooth decline in sales which would
be captured by the polynomial terms of the regression specification. In other words, shocks
can explain discontinuity at any given day only if their mass is concentrated at that day or the
mass of shocks increases discontinuously on that day.
While it is hard to argue why the mass of shocks should be concentrated or increase
discontinuously at a particular day, we check for discontinuities at alternative days. To do so
we run RD regressions choosing day other than 0 as cut-off.27 Figure 6 presents the results
with RD regressions ran separately for cut-offs in the range [-4,4]. The figure confirms that the
discontinuity is most pronounced, in magnitude and significance, for day= 0 as cut-off. Even
though cut-off of −1 shows a significant discontinuity, it is smaller in size and significant only at
the 10% level. This would point that discontinuity at cut-off −1 is driven by the discontinuity
at the cut-off 0.
Under the shock explanation, the discontinuity at cut-off 0, would imply that the shocks
are concentrated on the disbursal day. This would imply that merchants make no (or few)
errors in not only anticipating the shocks but also in synchronizing the arrival of the shock
with the loan disbursal. This is highly implausible given our explanations in Section 3.2. We
identify the disbursal-day discontinuity as an evidence for diversion because changes due to
shocks are likely to be smooth around disbursal day, but changes due to diversion are likely to
be discontinuous as the disbursal day marks the first possibility to initiate diversion.
The final factor that may threaten identification is a common exogenous negative shock to
merchants’ sales. Such a common shock will result in discontinuity if it coincided with the loan
27A general specification for the RD regression at an arbitrary cut-off, c, is below. c = 0 corresponds




























with the dummy Di,t := 1{dayi,t ≥ c} which is 1 when dayi,t ≥ c, and 0 otherwise.
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Figure 6: Local Linear Regression for Alternative Cut-off Days for Non-perfoming
Repeat Loans
Dependent Variable: Total Daily Transaction Value (normalized, 7-day window)
For a given cut-off, bar represents estimated discontinuity (estimated τ) obtained by a local linear
regression centered around that cut-off. 95% confidence interval for the estimated discontinuity is
represented by the corresponding vertical line. Regression estimation window for a given cut-off is
seven days (h = 7) on both sides of the cut-off. For each estimation, sample includes repeat loan of the
non-performing repeat borrowers. Repeat borrowers are merchants who took at least two loans from
the lender. Repeat loans include second and subsequent loans. Only those repeat loans are considered
that were disbursed more than 15 days after the closure of the preceding loan of the borrower. Non-
performing loans are either defaulting or late loans. For detailed definitions of samples see Table
A1.
disbursal. However, a common shock playing any role is ruled out because in our study, we pool
loans that were not concentrated in one period but rather spread over 13 months. Now, given
that we observe discontinuity in the sample of borrowers with repeat non-performing loans,
we need to also be sure that non-performing loans were not concentrated at a specific time
period. As evident from Table A2 in Appendix A, repeat loans were also spread over several
months–admittedly not uniformly. Further, we test whether the results for the sample of repeat
non-performing loans hold if we exclude all the loans disbursed in a particular month from
the sample. Results of this exercise with exclusion performed for each of the 13 months at a
time are presented in Table C11 in Appendix C. The results point that for each excluded month,
the estimate of discontinuity stays close to the 18 percentage point drop observed for the full
sample of repeat non-performing loans.
4.3 Lending Market Competition and Enforcement
Competition among lenders weakens debt enforcement. Having access to credit from other
sources diminishes a borrower’s value of their relationship with the current lender (Hoff and
Stiglitz, 1998). Therefore, we expect borrowers who have better access to the outside credit
market, to show a behavior of strategic default. Similarly, we expect borrowers who have
limited access to the credit market outside of their relationship with the payment fintech to not
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default strategically.
An indicator of ease of market access for a borrower is the borrower’s credit score. Borrowers
who have no credit history (no credit scores) have limited access to the credit market. Among
the scored borrowers, those with higher credit scores have better access to credit. However,
using credit scores as a proxy for outside opportunities and linking that with loan outcomes
could potentially be impaired by endogeneity issues. First, lenders usually consider a borrower’s
credit scores when making a loan decision. Therefore, the loan outcomes we observe will
not just be the result of a borrower’s outside opportunity but also a lender’s response to
that opportunity. Second, a borrower’s opportunistic behavior will be limited by the lender’s
reporting practice to the credit bureau because that affects a borrower’s future credit scores.
In our case, however, these issues do not arise. As for the issue of lender factoring in the
credit scores, our lender did not use the credit scores at any stage in the life of these loans. The
lender solely relied on the data relating to the merchants’ historical sales for loan decisions.
We can confirm this claim of the lender from our data in several ways. First, the fact that
about 10% of the borrowers were unscored (had insufficient credit history) at the time of the
borrowing indicates that lender heavily relied on past sales data.
Second, most significantly, among the loans for which the borrowers had scores, none of
the ex-ante loan contract terms correlate with credit scores. The three loan contract terms are
the interest rate, the deduction rate, and the loan amount. As discussed above, the interest
rate for all the loans was identical at 2% per month. The deduction rate was fixed at 10%.
So, these two contract terms were by design independent of credit score (or even borrower’s
past sales). The loan amount for both first loans and repeat loans does not appear to have
any correlation with the credit scores, too. This is apparent from the Figure 7. The figure also
shows, not surprisingly, that average past sales are highly correlated with the loan amount.
Finally, as another test to confirm the lender’s claim that scores were not used, we look for
any possible sorting of borrowers that the lender might have undertaken based on some cut-off
level of credit scores. Because a sorting at any cut-off will produce a discontinuity in the density
of the credit score, we can test for sorting by testing for the presence of a discontinuity in the
density of credit scores at different credit score thresholds. This is the idea of McCrary (2008).
We perform the McCrary test at different levels of credit scores in Figure A2 in Appendix A and
find no evidence of discontinuity anywhere. Notably, there is also no discontinuity around the
score 700, which is considered to be a threshold between a good and a bad credit score.
Our analysis is impervious to the issue of credit reporting because our lender, like the other
payment fintechs, did not report to the credit bureau for these loans. The reason for that could
be that fintech payment companies offer loans with flexible repayment. Bureau reporting is
designed to have a monthly reporting on loan performance and hence require a notion of a
rigid monthly target repayment.28
28While we are not sure if the merchants understood that lender would not report to credit bureau,
we think that merchants may have figured that out over their borrowing experience with the payment
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Figure 7: Loan Amount and Borrower Characteristics: Historical Sales vs. Credit Score
(a) Historical Sales and Loan Amount (b) Credit Scores and Loan Amount
Figure (a) shows the scatter between the average per day sales calculated over the 90-day period between
119 days and 30 days before loan disbursal (Pre-disbursal long-term average sales) and loan amount.
Figure (b) plots the scatter between credit score and loan amount. Credit scores correspond to that of
the merchant owning the business to which the loan was disbursed. TransUnion CIBIL credit scores
range between 300 and 900 with higher score indicating better borrower quality as per the bureau’s
assessment. Figure (b) considers only those loans for which the credit bureau was able to assign a credit
score and leaves out merchants who had insufficient credit history (unscored merchants). Vertical axes
in Figure (a) and Figure (b) showing loan amount are in log scale. Horizontal axis in Figure (a) is in log
scale. First loan includes the first (and only) loan of non-repeat borrowers and first loan of the repeat
borrowers. Repeat loan refers to second and subsequent loans of the repeat borrowers.
To analyze how credit market access affects a borrowing merchant’s sales behavior post-
disbursal, we divide the sample of borrowers into three categories. The first category comprises
borrowers who had a score equal or above 700 at the time of loan disbursal. According to
the credit bureau TransUnion CIBIL, borrowers with scores above 700 are considered good by
the financial institutions. Therefore, we consider these borrowers as having easier access to
the credit market, and hence, a better outside option. The second category of borrowers is
those with a credit score lower than 700. These borrowers had a poorer outside option at the
time of their loans. The third category of borrowers is the unscored borrowers, who had no
credit scores due to insufficient credit history. These borrowers can be thought of as having the
poorest outside option.
Figures 8 and 9, and Table 8 present the result of local regression for these three categories
of the borrowers. Since we are interested in looking at strategic default behaviour, we focus
again on repeat, non-performing loans. We see that borrowers with a score above 700 whose
loans end up as non-performing show a significant discontinuous drop in sales immediately
after disbursal. Borrowers with a credit score less than 700 show negative discontinuity as
well, but it is lower and not significant. Further, for < 700, the discontinuity estimate shrinks
closer to zero in a 90-day window (Table A6). Finally, for the unscored non-performing loans,
company.
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borrowers also do not show any discontinuity in sales. Thus, we find greater evidence of sales
manipulation for borrowers with better outside options.
Figure 8: Non-performing Repeat Loans – Normalized Transaction Value Pre- and Post-
Disbursal by Credit Score
(a) Credit Score ≥ 700 (b) Credit Score < 700
(c) Unscored
Points on the graphs represent the mean of the normalized daily transaction values over merchants.
Daily transaction values are normalized by the merchant’s average daily transaction value calculated in
the 90-day period between 119 days and 30 days before loan disbursal (Pre-disbursal long-term average
sales). On the horizontal axis, 0 represents the day of disbursal and negative integers refer to days before
disbursal and positive integers to days after disbursal. Credit scores correspond to that of the merchant
owning the business to which the loan was disbursed. Credit scores range between 300 and 900. Scores
above 700 are assessed as good by the credit market. Solid lines represent the fit by a local regression
for a 7-day window around disbursal. Dashed lines show 90% confidence interval using standard errors
clustered by loan. n in the legend refers to number of loans (number of borrowers). Samples consist of
only repeat loans. For the 7-day bandwidth, only those repeat loans are considered that were disbursed
more than 7 days after the closure of the previous loan of the borrower. Non-performing loans are either
defaulting or late loans. Late loans are those non-defaulting loans that took more than 30 days than the
implied tenure to fully repay the loan. For detailed definitions of samples see Table A1.
Zooming in further and looking at the default loans, our results are more striking. Borrowers
with a good score (≥ 700) reduce their sales by 40 percentage points instantly after disbursal,
33
Table 8: Local Linear Regressions by Credit Score
Dependent Variable: Normalized Daily Transaction Value
Non-performing, Repeat Loan Default, Repeat Loan
≥ 700 < 700 Unscored ≥ 700 < 700 Unscored
Intercept 1.03*** 1.00*** 0.88*** 1.25*** 0.86*** 0.59***
(0.09) (0.12) (0.32) (0.19) (0.13) (0.20)
(1−D)× day 0.01 0.02 5.9E-04 0.04 -7.9E-03 -0.08*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Discontinuity, D -0.22** -0.13 0.05 -0.40** -0.02 0.20
(0.10) (0.14) (0.24) (0.20) (0.20) (0.27)
D× day -3.0E-03 -1.0E-02 -0.04 -2.9E-03 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07)
No. Loans 589 362 72 225 176 28
No. Obs. 8,835 5,430 1,080 3,375 2,640 420
R2 0.15% 0.05% 0.16% 0.24% 0.01% 0.64%
R̄2 0.11% -0.03% -0.22% 0.12% -0.14% -0.32%
Bandwidth (h) 7 7 7 7 7 7
Cutoff 0 0 0 0 0 0
Regression samples include only repeat loans (second and subsequent loans), and only those that were
disbursed more than 7 days after the closure of the previous loan of the borrower. Standard errors
are clustered by loan and presented in parentheses. Credit scores correspond to that of the merchant
owning the business to which the loan was disbursed. Credit scores range between 300 and 900. Scores
above 700 are assessed as good by the credit market. For the unscored loans, the borrowers did not have
a long enough credit history at the time of the borrowing to have been assigned any score by the credit
bureau. Non-performing loans are either defaulting or late loans. Late loans are those non-defaulting
loans that took more than 30 days than the implied tenure to fully repay the loan. Default loans are
loans that had a shortfall > 5% of repayment amount and were either written off or still pending as of
end 2019. For detailed definitions of samples see Table A1. For detailed notes on regressions see Table
6.
Significance: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Figure 9: Default Repeat Loans – Normalized Transaction Value Pre- and Post- Disbursal
by Credit Score
(a) Credit Score ≥ 700 (b) Credit Score < 700
Default loans are loans that had a shortfall > 5% of repayment amount and were either written off or
still pending as of end 2019. See Figure 8 for detailed notes.
bringing sales to about 15% below their long-term average. Notably, these borrowers have
counterfactual sales that are 25% above their long-term sales on the eve of disbursal. This
dramatic fall in sales following a high sales period points to the voluntary nature of sales
diversion and is evidence of strategic default by borrowers who can access credit easily from
the credit market. Borrowers with a score of < 700 and those who were unscored do not
show a discontinuous drop in sales when defaulting. Note that our results do not suggest
that borrowers with high scores are a worse credit risk in the sense that they default more
often than those below 700. What our results show is that borrowers with high credit scores
default voluntarily, when they default. Indeed, the summary statistics in Table A3 in Appendix
A suggest that borrowers with scores < 700 have a higher non-performance (and default) rate.
A final point is that even if merchants have easy availability of credit from alternative
sources, they may not have the ability to default voluntarily if they cannot divert their sales
away from the payment company. As we discussed earlier, with sales-linked repayment, the
payment company reduces the borrower’s discretion and attains a senior position in the revenue
of the borrowers. Therefore, it must be that the strategic default, that we observe, is facilitated
by competing payment technologies that help the borrower in diverting sales away from the
lender’s POS. Next, we explore the technology that can help a borrower divert sales.
4.4 Payment Market Competition and Enforcement
A potential candidate for competing payment technology is cash. Manipulating merchants may
convince their customers to pay by cash rather than using cards. Other competing payment
technologies could be electronic, such as bank transfers, mobile payment or even a POS device
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from a competing payment company. The source that helps merchants divert sales and weakens
enforcement is of high relevance. If strengthening enforcement through technology is a policy
objective, then should we approach it through payment system (including currency management
policies) or competition policy? These two are completely different policy domains, after all.
To determine whether cash is the dominant means of diverting sales, we study an exogenous
cash-availability shock that struck a few regions in India in March-April 2018. The idea is that
if borrowing merchants show large disbursal-day discontinuity even in the middle of a cash
crunch, then it would imply that merchants use electronic means to divert sales. If, on the
other hand, we observe no or muted discontinuity amidst such cash shortage, then we infer
that merchants, at least partly, use cash to divert sales. We use heterogeneity in two dimensions
to identify the effect of the availability of cash on a merchant’s ability to manipulate sales. First,
the cash crunch arrived quite unexpectedly and lasted for a brief period of time. This gives us
the opportunity to compare the crunch period with a non-crunch period for borrowers from the
same districts. Second, the cash crunch affected some districts and did not affect others. This
gives us the opportunity to compare borrower sales for loans made in crunch districts during
the crunch period with loans made in non-crunch districts during the same period.
Given that the drop in sales appears to happen through high ticket size transactions, it is
not trivial that cash would be the obvious choice of diversion, because presumably persuading
a customer to make a high-value purchase with cash instead of card is more difficult for a
merchant. On the other hand, diversion of higher ticket sizes is more attractive. In this scenario,
evidence for a cash-led diversion would imply a fixed cost of persuasion, such that merchants
would employ persuasion for diversion only if it helps them divert a large sum of money.
The cash crunch started in mid-March 2018, with news about ATMs going dry in the
southern states Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.29 However, by mid-April 2018, the cash crunch
spread to several cities across the country and continued to be in the news until the end of
April 2018. Note, in contrast to the country-wide cash shortage of November 2016-January
2017 that followed the demonetization of large currency bills by the Government of India on
November 08, 2016, the cash crunch in March-April 2018 was not the result of any policy
decision, was felt only in certain parts of the country, and was shorter lived.
Because the 2018 cash crunch did not have any particular day as origin30 compared to the
2016 demonetization, we rely on news articles31 and data on Google searches to locate the
dates of the cash crunch. Figure 10 provides the rough timeline of the two cash shortages in
India. The figure plots the relative number of Google searches for the term “No money in ATM”
29See news report in Times of India (March 30, 2018).
30The cash crunch resulted due to a combination of several factors. The reasons, among others,
included (i) logistical issues, especially delays in calibrating the ATMs to new INR 200 bills, (ii) fear
among the public of the newly introduced bail-in clause in the Financial Resolution and Deposit Insurance
Bill that proposed that large deposits could be used to bail-in financial institutions and (iii) an unusual
currency demand in many states that were going for provincial elections in the upcoming months.
31See, for example, Economic Times (April 22, 2018b) and Economic Times (April 17, 2018a).
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Figure 10: Cash crunch episode of March-April, 2018
Source: Google Trends. Note: Google searches with terms "No money in ATM" or "No cash in ATM" in
the period June 2016-June 2019 in India. Searches are aggregated over weekly window. Figures are in
relative terms with maximum number of searches normalized to 100.
or “No cash in ATM.” The data is normalized such that the highest number of searches are
assigned a value of 100. Looking at this figure, we define March 20, 2018, to April 30, 2018,
as the cash crunch period.
Google trends data is not detailed enough to provide us a good regional decomposition
of the search results. Therefore, to determine the cash crunch districts, we look at the digital
payment data from our payment company partner for the non-borrowers (merchants who never
borrowed from the company in the period up to February 2019). The idea is that in cash
crunch districts and in the cash crunch period (20 March-30 April 2018), the number of card
transactions should exhibit an excess growth when compared to the long-term trend. Appendix
B describes our procedure for identifying cash crunch districts in detail. Figure B3 provides
examples of how the evolution of the number of transactions differs in crunch and non-crunch
districts. Table B7 provides the classification of districts into crunch and non-crunch districts.
Our assumption is that the cash crunch was uniformly spread in a district that is found to
have had a crunch by our criteria. We look at the transaction values around disbursal dates
and make the following comparisons:
i Loans made in the crunch period in the crunch districts versus loans made in non-crunch
districts in the same period.
ii Loans made in the non-crunch period in the crunch districts versus loans made in same
districts but in the crunch period.
The non-crunch period consists of the periods 01 October 2017 to 31 December 2017, and
01 June 2018 to 31 July 2018.32 We focus on the non-performing repeat loans again as those
32The idea behind including loans from some pre-crunch months (Oct-Dec, 2017) in the comparison
(non-crunch) months was to ensure that the comparison months remain representative. However,
37
are the loans that show manipulation by the borrowers. However, given that we now work
with shorter time periods, we have only a few numbers of loans in each sample. This limitation
creates a problem of precise estimation in the local linear regression. Therefore, we employ a
longer bandwidth of 90 days as well. Remember, as we widen the bandwidth we can include
only fewer repeat loans, but we gain on the number of transactions per loan.
Table 9 presents the regression results for the four samples of repeat non-performing loans
disbursed in (i) crunch period, crunch districts; (ii) crunch period, non-crunch districts; (iii)
non-crunch period, crunch districts; and (iv) non-crunch period, non-crunch districts. The same
set of regressions is performed for the narrow 7-day bandwidth and a wider 90-day bandwidth.
It is reassuring to see that despite different number of loans across the two bandwidths, the
discontinuity estimates for any sample are quite similar. The 90-day regressions make the
estimates of regression more precise for all samples except for the crunch district in the crunch
period. The discontinuity estimates for the crunch-districts-crunch-period sample remains
negative but insignificant in the 90-day window. As for the two comparisons mentioned above,
first, note that crunch districts in the crunch period show no significant discontinuity while non-
crunch districts show a significant discontinuity in the same period. Further, the discontinuity
for crunch districts becomes significant and is higher in magnitude in the non-crunch period
compared to the crunch period. Finally, the non-crunch districts show a significant discontinuity
in both time periods.
Figure 11 plots the merchant transaction values and the corresponding fit from local linear
regression across four samples. The figure visually confirms the results of the regressions
discussed above. Figure B4 in the Appendix B shows these comparisons for the 90-day window
along with a global polynomial fit, with essentially the same conclusions. Taken together, these
results imply that borrowers use cash, at least partly, to divert their sales away from the lending
payment company, thereby weakening debt enforcement.
There are certain limitations to this exercise. The cash crunch was rather short lived. We
roughly assigned the 40-day period spanning mid Mar-April as a crunch period for all the
districts that showed excess growth in transactions in some part of this 40-day period. While
40-day period itself is not long enough, for some crunch districts, the crunch did not necessarily
last all of 40 days. Our choice to assign all 40 days as crunch period was driven by the need to
include sufficient number of loans for the exercise. This did help us gain the insight that cash
is used to divert sales to circumvent credit enforcement. However, due to short-lived nature of
the shock, we cannot fully study debt enforcement in the counterfactual world where cash is
not available at all. The merchants seemed to have regained the control of their sales pretty
quickly once the crunch subsided. It is visible from Table A2 that even though mid Mar- April,
2018 saw episode of cash crunch, the rate of non-performance did not go down. Not only in
keeping in mind that the cash crunch itself might affect the repayment status of the loans (not disbursal
day discontinuity, though) disbursed before the crunch, we include loans from the pre-crunch periods
that were disbursed sufficiently long before the beginning of the cash crunch to minimize such an effect.
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aggregate, even for the crunch districts the rate of non-performance stayed high (about the
same as the overall) in this period. Therefore, our results show that while there might have
been limited diversion in the crunch period, the merchants could make up for it over time.
Figure 11: Cash Crunch – Normalized Transaction Value Pre- and Post- Disbursal for
Non-performing Repeat Loans
Crunch Period, Mar 20 – Apr 30, 2018
(a) Crunch Districts (b) Non-crunch Districts
Non-crunch Periods, Oct 1 – Dec 31, 2017 & Jun 1 – Jul 31, 2018
(c) Crunch Districts (d) Non-crunch Districts
Points on the graphs represent mean of the normalized daily transaction values, over merchants. Solid
lines represent the fit by a local regression for a 7-day window around disbursal. Dashed lines show 90%
confidence interval using standard errors clustered by loan. Samples consist of only non-performing
repeat loans. n in the legend refers to number of loans (number of borrowers). For detailed definitions
of samples see Table A1. For detailed notes on Figure see Figure 3. Appendix B describes the procedure
to classify districts into crunch and non-crunch districts. Table B7 in Appendix B gives the classification

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Payment fintechs as lenders possess a potential solution to weak debt enforcement that pervades
credit markets in economies with weak institutions. Payment fintechs acquire a senior position
in the digital sales of the borrowing merchants when processing payments for the merchants.
Therefore, through sales-linked repayment, the payment company can limit the borrowing
merchant’s discretion over their sales. However, we find that this seniority of payment fintechs
can be diluted as merchants can divert their sales away from the lending payment company.
We observe sales diversion as a discontinuous reduction in sales instantly after disbursal. This
brings out several interesting issues.
First, our result that sales diversion and default are closely linked, points to strategic default
which is commonly associated with credit markets with weak enforcement. What gives the
merchants the ability to voluntarily default? We find that borrowers who enjoy better access to
the credit market outside of their relationship with the fintech lender show the higher incidence
of diversion. While this result suggests that it is the competitive nature of the credit market that
weakens enforcement, we think the details are more nuanced. From the payment company’s
perspective, the borrower’s ability to default is determined by the existence of alternative
payment technology. This is because only an alternative payment technology can dilute the
seniority gained by the payment company lender. Using a cash crunch episode that affected
various districts heterogeneously, we find that defaulting merchants use cash, at least partly, as
a diversionary payment technology.
Second, our result would suggest that as economies move more towards digital payments,
this problem could be mitigated to a certain extent as it becomes difficult to substitute cash for
electronic payments. Emerging and developing economies are fast adopting digital payments
method. Even cash-dominant economies like India are rapidly catching up. According to data
from the Reserve Bank of India, in terms of the value of transactions, credit and debit card
use at POS terminals was about 36% of their use for ATM withdrawal in India in 2018/2019,
significantly up from only 12% six years earlier.33 By extension and in the extreme when cash
loses its importance, for instance with the retail central bank digital currency, enforcement
issues could be abated with sales-linked lending.
Third, even though our main results point to evidence that a payment fintech’s ability
to enforce debt is curtailed in the presence of competition from other lenders and payment
technologies, we do find some benefits of this kind of lending. We show payment fintechs
mainly serve MSMEs that have no credit history or short credit history. All their loans are also
uncollateralized. Thus, they serve borrowers that would find it hard to access bank credit,
especially without collateral. Moreover, we see that, on average, merchants continue to transact
at their long-term pre-disbursal average sales even after loan disbursal. Therefore, on average,
33In terms of the number of transactions, this ratio was 63% in the financial year 2018-2019, up from
16% in 2012-2013
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the payment business of the fintech company does not suffer, due to defaults in its lending
business. Further, the payment company’s ability to deduct repayment at source could still be
beneficial for it since that may reduce loss given default not only in no-fault default cases but
also when merchants default voluntarily.
Finally, payment fintechs and their lending business present an exciting case to study.
Payment fintechs across the globe have moved into lending. Their lending business is built on
several advantages. These include: (i) their ability to screen borrowers based on information
from payments data, (ii) their ability to acquire a senior position in the borrower’s revenue
stream, (iii) their ability to cross-sell lending and payments services which potentially enhances
the contracting options, and (iv) their ability to offer flexible-repayment loans to MSMEs by
making repayment sales-linked. The flexibility could be valuable to MSMEs that face volatile
sales. With flexible repayments, MSMEs can share some risk with the lender by paying less
in periods with lower sales and making up for it in the periods of higher sales. Our paper
focuses only on the payment fintechs’ seniority advantage. More research is required in the
other features of the lending business of the payment fintechs.
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Appendices
A Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Number of Days Required to Enforce a Contract of Unpaid Debt
Source: Calculations based on data provided in Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007). Note: Data is as
of January 2003.
Figure A2: Density of Borrowing Merchants’ Credit Scores
(a) Density of Credit Scores (b) Measures of Discontinuity in Density
Figure (a) shows the density of borrowing merchants’ credit scores (among scored merchants). Figure
(b) shows point-wise estimates for the discontinuity in the distribution of borrowing merchants’ credit
scores for varying credit score cut offs between 555 and 800 as solid black line. Routine to locate
discontinuity in density is performed using the mccrary function developed in Schäublin (2020) that
implements the procedure by McCrary (2008). We use a bin size of 5 and bandwidth of 50 for the
routine. Dashed line shows corresponding 95 percent confidence interval. Figure indicates no significant
discontinuity in the distribution of borrowing merchants credit scores at any selected credit score.
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Table A1: Definition of Samples
Samplea Definition
Repeat Borrowers Merchants borrowing multiple times from the lender.
Non-repeat Borrowers Merchants borrowing only once from the lender (until Feb 2019).
1st Loan First loan of repeat borrowers.
Repeat Loan Second or subsequent loan of repeat borrowers. Samples include only those
repeat loans where merchant’s preceding loan was closed outside of the
bandwidth under consideration. For example, if we employ a bandwidth of
7 days in an analysis, we include only those repeat loans that were disbursed
at least eight days after the closure of a preceding loan.
Default Loan Loan that had a shortfall > 5% of repayment amount and was either written
off or still pending as of end 2019.
Late Loan Non-defaulting loan that took more than 30 days than the implied tenure to
fully repay the loan. Implied tenure is the number of days it would take to
repay the loan (loan amount + interest) given the 10% deduction rate and if
the merchant after disbursal continued to transact at their pre-disbursal long-
term average. Pre-disbursal long-term average is average daily transaction
value calculated over 90 days between day 119 and day 30 before loan
disbursal.
Non-performing Loan Loan that is either late or in default.
Performing Loan Loan that is neither late nor in default.
a All samples comprise of loans disbursed between October 2017 and November 2018, and loans with 90

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A4: Summary Statistics on Transactions According to Loan Repayment Status
Normalized Mean values (except number of loans)
Performing Loans Non-performing Loans
All Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers All Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers
Brwrs. Brwrs. 1st loan Rep. Loan Brwrs. Brwrs. 1st loan Rep. Loan
Transaction value
180-day window 1.15 1.08 1.18 1.16 0.78 0.75 0.80 0.81
−7 to −1 days 1.19 1.20 1.18 1.20 0.90 0.89 0.81 0.95
0 to 7 days 1.15 1.10 1.16 1.17 0.79 0.75 0.80 0.81
Pre-disbursal long-term 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Pre-disbursal short-term 1.10 1.09 1.10 1.10 0.99 1.01 0.96 1.00
Post-disbursal 1.21 1.08 1.25 1.22 0.57 0.48 0.64 0.62
Number of transactions
180-day window 1.10 1.05 1.12 1.10 0.83 0.77 0.88 0.85
−7 to −1 days 1.11 1.07 1.11 1.12 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.94
0 to 7 days 1.10 1.07 1.11 1.11 0.84 0.78 0.87 0.87
Pre-disbursal long-term 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Pre-disbursal short-term 1.06 1.05 1.07 1.05 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99
Post-disbursal 1.14 1.05 1.18 1.15 0.67 0.55 0.77 0.71
Number of loans 6,458 1,112 2,594 2,752 2,869 1,040 613 1,216
All values, except for number of loans, are average per day per borrowing merchant calculated over a
window. 180-day window is centred at the disbursal date and covers 90 days prior and 90 days after
disbursal including the day of disbursal. Day 0 refers to the disbursal date. Days with a minus sign are
days prior to disbursal. Pre-disbursal long-term period refers to the 90-day period between days -119
and -30. It aims to capture the average sales away from the disbursal date. Pre-disbursal short-term
period refers to the 90-day period between days -90 and -1 and is considered short term for including
days shortly before the disbursal. Post-disbursal refers to the 90-day window between day 0 and day
89. We normalize the transaction value and number of transactions by their averages calculated in the
Pre-disbursal long-term period respectively.
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Table A5: Regression in 7-day Window with Number of Transactions – Performing vs.
Non-Performing Loans
Dependent Variable: Normalized Daily Number of Transactions
All Performing Loans Non-performing Loans
Brwrs. Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers
& Loans Brwrs. 1st Loan Rep. Loan Brwrs. 1st Loan Rep. Loan
Intercept 1.04*** 1.05*** 1.12*** 1.12*** 0.79*** 0.87*** 1.00***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
(1−D)× day -1.6E-04 -9.7E-04 2.4E-03 3.6E-04 -0.02*** -1.3E-03 0.01*
(2.6E-03) (7.4E-03) (4.9E-03) (5.1E-03) (7.2E-03) (8.2E-03) (7.4E-03)
Discontinuity, D -0.05*** -0.04 -0.09*** 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.11***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
D× day 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.06*** -7.3E-03* -0.01** -9.6E-03 -5.9E-03
(7.4E-03) (0.02) (0.01) (4.4E-03) (5.4E-03) (6.6E-03) (5.5E-03)
D× (day)2 -6.5E-03*** -0.01*** -7.9E-03***
(9.9E-04) (2.8E-03) (1.8E-03)
No. Loans 9,327 1,112 2,594 2,752 1,040 613 1,216
No. Obs. 139,905 16,680 38,910 41,280 15,600 9,195 18,240
R2 0.03% 0.09% 0.05% 0.01% 0.24% 0.02% 0.10%
R̄2 0.03% 0.06% 0.04% -0.00% 0.22% -0.02% 0.08%
Bandwidth (h) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Cutoff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Results from local regression of merchants’ normalized daily number of transactions as dependent
variable. Daily number of transactions is normalized by the merchant’s average number of transactions
per-day calculated in the 90-day period between 119 days and 30 days before loan disbursal (pre-disbursal
long-term average). Regression uses number of days since loan disbursal (day) as running variable. Day
number centred around day of loan disbursal, such that day = 0 for disbursal date and day > 0 for
days after disbursal, and negative otherwise. D is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if day≥ 0 and 0
otherwise. Repeat borrowers are merchants who took at least two loans from the lender. Repeat loans
include second and subsequent loans. Only those repeat loans are considered that were disbursed more
than 7 days after the closure of the preceding loan of the borrower. Non-performing loans are either
defaulting or late loans. For detailed definitions of samples see Table A1. All samples include loans
disbursed between October 2017 and November 2018, and with 90-day or 180-day suggested maturity.
Standard errors are clustered by loan and given in parentheses. Local regression is performed using a
box kernel, over a 7-day bandwidth. Number of polynomial terms on each side of cut-off correspond to
the specification with the lowest BIC.
Significance: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table A6: Regressions in 90-day window by Credit Score
Dependent Variable: Normalized Daily Transaction Value
Non-performing, Repeat Loan Default, Repeat Loan
≥ 700 < 700 Unscored ≥ 700 < 700 Unscored
Intercept 0.99*** 0.64*** 0.94*** 1.24*** 0.66*** 1.09***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.20) (0.13) (0.18)
(1−D)× day 1.1E-03 -4.7E-03*** 2.8E-04 5.4E-03 -3.2E-03 2.0E-03
(1.4E-03) (1.5E-03) (1.8E-03) (3.3E-03) (2.0E-03) (3.0E-03)
Discontinuity, D -0.26*** 0.03 -0.28*** -0.43** 0.05 -0.32
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.17) (0.12) (0.21)
D× day -2.4E-03*** -3.8E-03*** -1.1E-03 -3.8E-03*** -5.2E-03*** -2.7E-03**
(7.0E-04) (1.1E-03) (1.2E-03) (1.5E-03) (1.5E-03) (1.3E-03)
No. Loans 127 75 22 42 42 8
No. Obs. 22,917 13,494 3,982 7,602 7,563 1,448
R2 0.72% 1.26% 1.12% 0.90% 1.44% 1.41%
R̄2 0.70% 1.23% 1.02% 0.84% 1.39% 1.14%
Bandwidth (h) 90 90 90 90 90 90
Cutoff 0 0 0 0 0 0
Regression samples include only repeat loans (second and subsequent loans), and only those that were
disbursed more than 90 days after the closure of the previous loan of the borrower. Standard errors
are clustered by loan and presented in parentheses. Credit scores correspond to that of the merchant
owning the business to which the loan was disbursed. Credit scores range between 300 and 900. Scores
above 700 are assessed as good by the credit market. For the unscored loans, the borrowers did not have
a long enough credit history at the time of the borrowing to have been assigned any score by the credit
bureau. Non-performing loans are either defaulting or late loans. Late loans are those non-defaulting
loans that took more than 30 days than the implied tenure to fully repay the loan. Default loans are
loans that had a shortfall > 5% of repayment amount and were either written off or still pending as of
end 2019. For detailed definitions of samples see Table A1. For detailed notes on regressions see Table 6.
Number of polynomial terms on each side of cut-off correspond to the specification with the lowest BIC.
Significance: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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B Cash Crunch
Identifying Cash Crunch Districts
We aggregate the number of transactions for all non-borrowing merchants34 at the district level
and a daily frequency for the period 1 June 2017 to 28 February 2019. Then, for each day in
this period, we compute the deviation of the medium-term trend of a district’s total number of
transactions from the long-term trend. The idea is to capture any unusual or “excess” deviation
in transactions in a district compared to its own long-term trend. Districts showing sufficiently
high positive deviation from the trend in the period of March–April 2018 can be thought of as
ones that faced a cash crunch.
More precisely, we do the following for each district:
1. Compute a long-term trend value in the number of transactions for each day in the period
June 2017–February 2019 by estimating mean, using Epanechnikov Kernel weights, over
a six-month window centered around that day (3 months of data on either side of the
date).
2. Compute a medium-term trend value of the total number of transactions for each day
in the period June 2017–February 2019 by estimating the mean, using Epanechnikov
Kernel weights, over a two-month window centered around that day (one month of data
on either side of the date).
3. Compute the deviation of the medium-term trend value from the long-term trend value
for each day in the sample. To make the differences comparable across districts, we
normalize these daily differences by the mean and standard deviation of the differences
to obtain a z-score for each district. The mean and standard deviations of the differences
are estimated over the sample period but leaving out the crunch period of March 20–April
30, 2018, so as not to let the unusual period affect the calculations of these parameters.
For steps (1) and (2) we employ the X-13 Matlab toolbox for seasonal filtering by Lengwiler
(2021). Among the districts for which we have sufficient loan data, we select those districts as
crunch districts where the maximum z-score in the crunch period of 20 March—30 April 2018 is
bigger than 1.645, and those as non-crunch districts where the maximum of the standardized
deviations is below 1.645. For this classification, we consider only those districts that have
more than 50 non-borrowing merchants active every month in the period 1 June 2017–28
February 2019. The list of districts classified as crunch and non-crunch are given in Table B7.
Figure B3 also provides representative examples of crunch and non-crunch districts, plotting
trends in the number of transactions and the z-scores.
34Those merchants who did not borrow in the period until February 2019.
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Table B7: Crunch Districts, Number of Merchants and Loans
Crunch Full Perioda Crunch Periodb Non-Crunch Periodc
State District District All Loans Brwrs. Rep. Loans Brwrs. Rep. Loans Brwrs.
Andhra Pradesh Visakhapatnam No 57 37 - - 2 2
Delhi South West Delhi No 156 103 4 4 3 3
West Delhi No 132 94 2 2 1 1
Gujarat Ahmedabad No 101 67 5 5 8 7
Haryana Faridabad No 76 50 - - 3 3
Karnataka Bangalore No 2,073 1,330 14 14 36 35
Kerala Ernakulam No 59 37 - - 1 1
Maharashtra Kolhapur No 40 22 - - 2 2
Nagpur No 76 50 1 1 2 2
Pune No 1,373 895 21 21 35 35
Raigarh(Mh) No 119 71 1 1 4 4
Solapur No 31 15 - - 2 2
Punjab Patiala No 23 14 - - - -
Rajasthan Jaipur No 77 43 2 2 2 2
Tamil Nadu Chennai No 368 224 1 1 10 10
Coimbatore No 158 99 2 2 7 7
Kanchipuram No 372 225 5 5 10 10
Tiruvallur No 207 132 1 1 7 7
West Bengal Kolkata No 40 26 1 1 1 1
North 24 Parg. No 16 13 - - - -
Total Non-Crunch Districts 20 5,554 3,547 60 60 136 134
Crunch Full Perioda Crunch Periodb Non-Crunch Periodc
State District District All Loans Brwrs. Rep. Loans Brwrs. Rep. Loans Brwrs.
Delhi East Delhi Yes 111 73 2 2 4 4
North Delhi Yes 56 38 2 2 1 1
North W. Delhi Yes 42 30 2 2 1 1
South Delhi Yes 79 55 - - 2 2
Haryana Gurgaon Yes 126 83 4 4 4 4
Madhya Pradesh Indore Yes 127 83 1 1 4 4
Maharashtra Aurangabad Yes 53 39 2 2 2 2
Mumbai Yes 708 456 10 10 9 9
Nashik Yes 97 71 3 3 5 5
Thane Yes 967 595 16 16 27 27
Telangana Hyderabad Yes 715 453 15 15 27 27
K.V. Rang. Yes 238 156 4 4 5 5
Uttar Pradesh G. B. Nagar Yes 116 71 6 6 4 4
Ghaziabad Yes 148 100 2 2 1 1
Total Crunch Districts 12 3,583 2,303 69 69 96 96
a All loans disbursed in the district between October 2017 and November 2018 with 90 or 180 days suggested maturity.
b Repeat loans disbursed in district between March 20 and April 30, 2018, with 90 or 180 days suggested maturity.
c Repeat loans disbursed in district between October 1 and December 31, 2017, or between June 1 and July 31, 2018,
with 90 or 180 days suggested maturity and more than 7 days after the closure of the preceding loan.
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Figure B3: Representative Examples of Crunch and Non-crunch Districts
Number of Transactions and Z-scores
(a) Crunch district (Hyderabad – Telangana)
(b) Non-crunch district (Pune – Maharashtra)
Left panels plot the daily number of transactions aggregated over all the merchants in the district. The
daily medium term trend plots for a day the mean estimated using Epanechnikov Kernel weights, over
a two-month window centered around that day (one month of data on either side of the date). The
daily long-term trend plots for a day the mean estimated using Epanechnikov Kernel weights, over
a six-month bandwidth centered around that day (3 months of data on either side of the date). The
right panels plot the z-score for the district which is normalized the deviation of the deviation of the
medium-term trend value from the long-term trend value. Districts with the maximum normalized
deviation above 1.645 in the period 20 March - 30 April, 2018 are classified as cash crunch districts.
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Cash Crunch and Sales Around Disbursal: 90-day Window
Figure B4: Cash Crunch – Normalized Transaction Value Pre- and Post- Disbursal for
Non-performing Repeat Loans
Crunch Period, Mar 20 – Apr 30, 2018
(a) Crunch Districts (b) Non-crunch Districts
Non-crunch Periods, Oct 1 – Dec 31, 2017 & Jun 1 – Jul 31, 2018
(c) Crunch Districts (d) Non-crunch Districts
Points on the graphs represent mean of the normalized daily transaction values, over merchants. Daily
transaction values are normalized by the merchant’s average daily transaction value calculated in the
90-day period between 119 days and 30 days before loan disbursal (Pre disbursal long term average
sales). On the horizontal axis, 0 represents the day of disbursal and negative integers refer to days before
disbursal and positive integers to days after disbursal. Solid lines represent the fit by a polynomial
regression for a 90-day window around disbursal. Number of polynomial terms on each side of cut-off
correspond to the specification with the lowest BIC. Dashed lines show 90% confidence interval using
standard errors clustered by loan. n in the legend refers to number of loans (number of borrowers).
Samples consist of only non-performing repeat loans. For detailed definitions of samples see Table A1.
For the 90-day bandwidth, only those repeat loans are considered that were disbursed more than 90 days
after the closure of the previous loan of the borrower. Table B7 in Appendix B gives the classification of
districts as crunch and non-crunch districts.
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C Internet Appendix: Robustness Checks
C.1 Alternative Estimation Windows
Table C8: 14-day window – Performing vs. Non-Performing Loans
Dependent Variable: Normalized Daily Transaction Value
All Performing Loans Non-performing Loans
Brwrs. Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers
& Loans Brwrs. 1st Loan Rep. Loan Brwrs. 1st Loan Rep. Loan
Intercept 1.08*** 1.16*** 1.18*** 1.19*** 0.84*** 0.82*** 0.94***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
(1−D)× day -2.5E-03 -4.8E-03 -2.3E-03 -1.1E-03 -0.01** -9.7E-05 3.9E-03
(1.8E-03) (5.0E-03) (3.2E-03) (3.7E-03) (4.7E-03) (4.7E-03) (5.0E-03)
Discontinuity, D -0.06*** -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -7.9E-03 -0.11**
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
D× day 2.0E-03 -2.5E-03 9.3E-03*** 8.0E-03** -8.2E-03** -3.4E-03 -0.01***
(1.5E-03) (4.1E-03) (2.8E-03) (3.4E-03) (3.7E-03) (4.4E-03) (3.7E-03)
No. Loans 8,480 1,112 2,594 2,110 1,040 613 1,011
No. Obs. 245,920 32,248 75,226 61,190 30,160 17,777 29,319
R2 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.01% 0.24% 0.01% 0.16%
R̄2 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.22% -0.01% 0.15%
Bandwidth (h) 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Cutoff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Results from local regression of merchants’ normalized daily transaction value as dependent variable.
Daily transaction values are normalized by the merchant’s average daily transaction value calculated in
the 90-day period between 119 days and 30 days before loan disbursal (pre-disbursal long-term average
sales). Regression uses number of days since loan disbursal (day) as running variable. Day number
centred around day of loan disbursal, such that day= 0 for disbursal date and day> 0 for days after
disbursal, and negative otherwise. D is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if day≥ 0 and 0 otherwise.
Repeat borrowers are merchants who took at least two loans from the lender. Repeat loans include
second and subsequent loans. Only those repeat loans are considered that were disbursed more than 14
days after the closure of the preceding loan of the borrower. Non-performing loans are either defaulting
or late loans. Late loans are those non-defaulting loans that took more than 30 days than the implied
tenure to fully repay the loan. Default loans are loans that had a shortfall > 5% of repayment amount
and were either written off or still pending as of end 2019. For detailed definitions of samples see Table
A1. All samples include loans disbursed between October 2017 and November 2018, and with 90-day or
180-day suggested maturity. Standard errors are clustered by loan and given in parentheses. Polynomial
regression is performed using a box kernel, over a 14-day bandwidth. Number of polynomial terms on
each side of cut-off correspond to the specification with the lowest BIC.
Significance: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table C9: 30-day window – Performing vs. Non-Performing Loans
Dependent Variable: Normalized Daily Transaction Value
All Performing Loans Non-performing Loans
Brwrs. Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers
& Loans Brwrs. 1st Loan Rep. Loan Brwrs. 1st Loan Rep. Loan
Intercept 1.05*** 1.20*** 1.13*** 1.23*** 0.85*** 0.79*** 0.90***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
(1−D)× day -9.7E-03*** 2.1E-04 -0.01*** 5.0E-03*** -8.7E-03*** -4.0E-03** 1.2E-03
(2.5E-03) (1.8E-03) (4.4E-03) (1.6E-03) (1.8E-03) (1.7E-03) (2.0E-03)
(1−D)× (day)2 -2.9E-04*** -4.5E-04***
(7.9E-05) (1.4E-04)
Discontinuity, D -7.5E-03 -0.07* 0.03 -0.10** -0.06* 0.05 -0.11**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
D× day -1.3E-03** -1.8E-03 3.4E-03*** 3.1E-03** -8.7E-03*** -9.1E-03*** -8.6E-03***
(5.6E-04) (1.4E-03) (1.0E-03) (1.5E-03) (1.2E-03) (1.3E-03) (1.5E-03)
No. Loans 7,217 1,112 2,594 1,219 1,040 613 639
No. Obs. 440,237 67,832 158,234 74,359 63,440 37,393 38,979
R2 0.04% 0.04% 0.02% 0.02% 0.77% 0.36% 0.40%
R̄2 0.04% 0.04% 0.01% 0.02% 0.76% 0.34% 0.39%
Bandwidth (h) 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Cutoff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Results from local regression of merchants’ normalized daily transaction value as dependent variable.
Daily transaction values are normalized by the merchant’s average daily transaction value calculated in
the 90-day period between 119 days and 30 days before loan disbursal (pre-disbursal long-term average
sales). Regression uses number of days since loan disbursal (day) as running variable. Day number
centred around day of loan disbursal, such that day= 0 for disbursal date and day> 0 for days after
disbursal, and negative otherwise. D is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if day≥ 0 and 0 otherwise.
Repeat borrowers are merchants who took at least two loans from the lender. Repeat loans include
second and subsequent loans. Only those repeat loans are considered that were disbursed more than 30
days after the closure of the preceding loan of the borrower. Non-performing loans are either defaulting
or late loans. Late loans are those non-defaulting loans that took more than 30 days than the implied
tenure to fully repay the loan. Default loans are loans that had a shortfall > 5% of repayment amount
and were either written off or still pending as of end 2019. For detailed definitions of samples see Table
A1. All samples include loans disbursed between October 2017 and November 2018, and with 90-day or
180-day suggested maturity. Standard errors are clustered by loan and given in parentheses. Polynomial
regression is performed using a box kernel, over a 30-day bandwidth. Number of polynomial terms on
each side of cut-off correspond to the specification with the lowest BIC.
Significance: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table C10: 90-day Window – Performing vs. Non-Performing Loans
Dependent Variable: Normalized Daily Transaction Value
All Performing Loans Non-performing Loans
Brwrs. Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers
& Loans Brwrs. 1st Loan Rep. Loan Brwrs. 1st Loan Rep. Loan
Intercept 1.11*** 1.25*** 1.25*** 1.16*** 0.87*** 0.75*** 0.89***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
(1−D)× day -2.0E-04 3.4E-03*** 3.3E-03*** 3.0E-03*** -8.2E-03*** -8.0E-03*** -6.3E-04
(5.3E-04) (3.5E-04) (2.2E-04) (6.2E-04) (1.3E-03) (1.4E-03) (9.0E-04)
(1−D)× (day)2 -2.2E-05*** -8.3E-05*** -5.7E-05***
(5.4E-06) (1.3E-05) (1.5E-05)
Discontinuity, D -0.08*** -0.14*** -0.05*** 0.02 -0.08*** 0.05 -0.18***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
D× day -8.0E-04*** -7.1E-04** 1.2E-03*** 5.9E-04 -9.9E-03*** -7.4E-03*** -2.5E-03***
(1.5E-04) (3.6E-04) (2.5E-04) (6.9E-04) (9.5E-04) (1.1E-03) (5.3E-04)
D× (day)2 5.1E-05*** 6.2E-05***
(9.6E-06) (1.1E-05)
No. Loans 6,066 1,112 2,594 429 1,040 613 278
No. Obs. 1,096,193 200,987 468,877 77,400 188,089 110,699 50,141
R2 0.05% 0.09% 0.19% 0.19% 2.35% 1.03% 0.77%
R̄2 0.05% 0.09% 0.19% 0.19% 2.34% 1.03% 0.76%
Bandwidth (h) 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Cutoff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Results from local regression of merchants’ normalized daily transaction value as dependent variable.
Daily transaction values are normalized by the merchant’s average daily transaction value calculated in
the 90-day period between 119 days and 30 days before loan disbursal (pre-disbursal long-term average
sales). Regression uses number of days since loan disbursal (day) as running variable. Day number
centred around day of loan disbursal, such that day= 0 for disbursal date and day> 0 for days after
disbursal, and negative otherwise. D is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if day≥ 0 and 0 otherwise.
Repeat borrowers are merchants who took at least two loans from the lender. Repeat loans include
second and subsequent loans. Only those repeat loans are considered that were disbursed more than 90
days after the closure of the preceding loan of the borrower. Non-performing loans are either defaulting
or late loans. Late loans are those non-defaulting loans that took more than 30 days than the implied
tenure to fully repay the loan. Default loans are loans that had a shortfall > 5% of repayment amount
and were either written off or still pending as of end 2019. For detailed definitions of samples see Table
A1. All samples include loans disbursed between October 2017 and November 2018, and with 90-day or
180-day suggested maturity. Standard errors are clustered by loan and given in parentheses. Polynomial
regression is performed using a box kernel, over a 90-day bandwidth. Number of polynomial terms on
each side of cut-off correspond to the specification with the lowest BIC.
Significance: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Figure C5: Repeat Borrowers – Normalized Transaction Value Pre- and Post- Disbursal
90-day window
Performing Loans, Repeat Borrowers
(a) 1st Loan (b) Repeat Loans
Non-performing Loans, Repeat Borrowers
(c) 1st Loan (d) Repeat Loans
Points on the graphs represent mean of the normalized daily transaction values, over merchants. Daily
transaction values are normalized by the merchant’s average daily transaction value calculated in the
90-day period between 119 days and 30 days before loan disbursal (pre-disbursal long-term average
sales). On the horizontal axis, 0 represents the day of disbursal and negative integers refer to days before
disbursal and positive integers to days after disbursal. Solid lines represent the fit by a polynomial
regression for a 90-day window around disbursal. Number of polynomial terms on each side of cut-off
correspond to the specification with the lowest BIC. Dashed lines show 90% confidence interval using
standard errors clustered by loan. Dashed vertical line shows date of loan disbursal. n in the legend
refers to number of loans (number of borrowers). Repeat borrowers are merchants who took at least
two loans from the lender. Repeat loans include second and subsequent loans. Only those repeat loans
are considered that were disbursed more than 90 days after the closure of the preceding loan of the
borrower. Non-performing loans are either defaulting or late loans. Late loans are those non-defaulting
loans that took more than 30 days than the implied tenure to fully repay the loan. Default loans are
loans that had a shortfall > 5% of repayment amount and were either written off or still pending as of
end 2019. All samples include loans disbursed between October 2017 and November 2018, and with
90-day or 180-day suggested maturity. For detailed definitions of samples see Table A1.
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Figure C6: Non-repeat Borrowers – Normalized Transaction Value Pre- and Post-
Disbursal
90-day window
(a) Performing Loans (b) Non-performing Loans
Non-repeat borrowers are those that borrowed only once until Feb 2019. Non-performing loans are
either defaulting or late loans. Performing loans are those that are not non-performing. For more details
see notes for Figure C5 and for detailed definitions of samples see Table A1.
Figure C7: Default Loans – Normalized Transaction Value Pre- and Post- Disbursal
90-day Window
(a) Non-Repeat Borrowers (b) Repeat Borrowers, Repeat Loan
Default loans are loans that had a shortfall > 5% of repayment amount and were either written off or
still pending as of end 2019. For more details see notes for Figure C5 and for detailed definitions of
samples see Table A1.
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C.2 Robustness Check Across Month of Disbursal
Table C11: Local Linear Regressions for Non-Performing Repeat Loans Excluding
Particular Months
Dependent Variable: Normalized Daily Transaction Value
Oct - Dec, 2017 Jan - Apr, 2018
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr
Intercept 1.02*** 1.01*** 1.00*** 1.02*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.01***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
(1−D)× day 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 9.4E-03 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Discontinuity, D -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.17** -0.18** -0.19** -0.17** -0.18**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
D× day -4.2E-03 -4.2E-03 -6.4E-03 -6.8E-03 -1.2E-03 -7.0E-03 -5.6E-03
(9.3E-03) (9.1E-03) (9.6E-03) (9.5E-03) (9.6E-03) (9.4E-03) (9.4E-03)
No. Loans 1201 1216 1130 1091 1102 1121 1157
No. Obs. 18015 18240 16950 16365 16530 16815 17355
R2 0.10% 0.10% 0.09% 0.10% 0.12% 0.10% 0.09%
R̄2 0.08% 0.08% 0.07% 0.08% 0.10% 0.08% 0.07%
Bandwidth (h) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Cutoff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
May - Nov, 2018
May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
Intercept 0.99*** 1.00*** 1.02*** 1.01*** 1.03*** 1.02*** 1.05***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
(1−D)× day 9.4E-03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Discontinuity, D -0.16** -0.19*** -0.18** -0.18** -0.21*** -0.19** -0.20***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
D× day 1.1E-04 -1.6E-03 -4.5E-03 -3.7E-03 -1.6E-03 -2.6E-03 -9.6E-03
(9.9E-03) (8.8E-03) (9.4E-03) (9.4E-03) (9.4E-03) (0.01) (0.01)
No. Loans 1066 1171 1165 1178 1146 1034 1030
No. Obs. 15990 17565 17475 17670 17190 15510 15450
R2 0.08% 0.09% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.09% 0.14%
R̄2 0.05% 0.07% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.07% 0.11%
Bandwidth (h) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Closuregap -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8
Cutoff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Regression sample includes only repeat non-performing loans but excluding the loans disbursed in
the month indicated. Dependent variable is the normalized daily transaction value of the borrowing
merchant. Daily transaction values are normalized by the merchant’s average daily transaction value
calculated in the 90-day period between 119 days and 30 days before loan disbursal (pre-disbursal
long-term average). Regression uses number of days since loan disbursal (day) as running variable.
Day number centred around day of loan disbursal, such that day = 0 for disbursal date and day > 0
for days after disbursal, and negative otherwise. D is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if day≥ 0
and 0 otherwise. Repeat loans include second and subsequent loans. Only those repeat loans are
considered that were disbursed more than 7 days after the closure of the preceding loan of the borrower.
Non-performing loans are either defaulting or late loans. For detailed definitions of samples see Table A1.
Standard errors are clustered by loan and given in parentheses. Local (linear) regression is performed
using a box kernel, over a 7-day bandwidth.
Significance: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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C.3 Alternative Definitions of Non-performing Loans
Table C12: Local Linear Regression for Repeat Loans by Varying Definition of Late
Loans
Dependent Variable: Normalized Daily Transaction Value
30 days past 90 days past





Discontinuity, D -0.18*** -0.14** -0.22** -0.19**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09)
No. Loans 1216 1467 697 888
No. Obs. 18240 22005 10455 13320
Rep. Loan
Late
Discontinuity, D -0.17* -0.11 -0.23 -0.11
(0.09) (0.08) (0.21) (0.13)
No. Loans 710 961 191 411
No. Obs. 10650 14415 2865 6165
Rep. Loan
Performing
Discontinuity, D 0.04 0.03 7.0E-03 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
No. Loans 2752 2501 3271 3080
No. Obs. 41280 37515 49065 46200
Bandwidth (h) 7 7 7 7
Cutoff 0 0 0 0
Columns refer to different criteria that classify a loan as late. A classification criterion depends on the
notion of loan tenure (implied or suggested) and the number of days beyond tenure (30 or 90) that
make the loan late. Implied tenure is the number of days it would take to repay the loan (loan amount
+ interest) given the 10% deduction rate and if the merchant after disbursal continued to transact at
their pre-disbursal long-term average. Pre-disbursal long-term average is average daily transaction
value calculated over 90 days between day 119 and day 30 before loan disbursal. Suggested tenure was
the tenure that was recommended by the lender but breaching that did not entail any late fees. Our
baseline definition, that we apply throughout the paper, corresponds to implied tenure and 30 days past
tenure criteria. Varying late criteria varies samples of late loans, non-performing loans and performing
loans. Non-performing loans are either defaulting or late loans. Performing loans are those that are not
non-performing. Table presents the discontinuity estimates from local linear regressions for different
sample under varying definition of late loans. For detailed notes on regressions see Table 6. For detailed
definitions of samples see Table A1.
Significance: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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C.4 Ruling Out Seasonality as an Alternative Explanation
Another alternative explanation for the observed discontinuity is that it is the result of seasonal
effects. Indeed, merchants’ individual data show weekly seasonality, with more transactions
happening over the weekends. Suppose the hypothetical case that all loans were disbursed
on Mondays. Then, the observed drop in sales on the day of disbursal will simply reflect
the seasonal effect of the difference between weekends (the days preceding disbursals) and
weekdays (the days after disbursals). Because loans were disbursed on different weekdays, one
could (bluntly) argue that merchants’ individual weekly seasonality would be smoothed out in
the aggregate. However, we still need to worry about it. The reason is that the distribution of
the disbursal days over the days of the week is not uniform; there were fewer loans disbursed
on Saturdays than during the working week, and no loans were disbursed on Sundays. As
a consequence of this non-uniform distribution, the distribution of covered weekdays differs
across different days since disbursal. This results in a seasonality also in the aggregated time
series, despite the overlap of the individual seasonal effects in the aggregated series. To illustrate
the mechanism, suppose, for simplicity, no loan was disbursed over the weekend, and all loans
were evenly disbursed over the working week. Recall that our merchants transact more over the
weekend (Saturday - Sunday) than on weekdays (Monday - Friday). Now, the aggregate of sales
over merchants, made on the day of disbursal (day = 0) will include transactions made only on
weekdays but no transactions made on the high-sales weekend. The subsequent day, though,
(day = 1), will include transactions on Tuesdays through Fridays and also from Saturdays.
That is, the aggregate will also include transactions on one of the high-sales weekend days.
The aggregates sales on day= 2, 3, 4, 5 will also include transactions made on Saturdays and
Sundays, and, hence, include even more high-sales weekend days. Similarly, for aggregate sales
on day= 6 we will include, in addition to other days, only Sunday. For aggregate transaction
on day = 7, again, we will include no weekend-day transactions. Similarly, the day before
disbursal, day = −1, will include Sunday of the weekend transactions, and the preceding days
day= −5,−4,−3,−2 will include both weekend days.
To control for these seasonal effects, following the suggestion of Hausman and Rapson
(2018), we first regress the daily normalized sales against the day-of-the-week dummies and
obtain the residuals. As a second step, we perform the same regression as before, but now
esalesi,t is the residual of the normalized transaction value. The results, presented in Table
C13, are very close to the baseline results, indicating that such seasonal variations have no
effects on our results.
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Table C13: Local Linear Regression with Residuals: Performing vs. Non-Performing
Loans
Dependent Variable: Residuals of Normalized Daily Transactions Value
All Performing Loans Non-performing Loans
Brwrs. Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers Non-rep. Repeat Borrowers
& Loans Brwrs. 1st Loan Rep. Loan Brwrs. 1st Loan Rep. Loan
Intercept 1.1E-03 -0.07 -0.02 1.5E-03 -0.05 -0.02 0.17***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
(1−D)× day -0.02*** -0.05*** -0.01* -0.02* -0.05*** -5.9E-03 0.01
(4.7E-03) (0.02) (8.7E-03) (8.7E-03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Discontinuity, D 0.04 0.21*** 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.02 -0.17**
(0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
D× day -5.0E-03 -0.03*** 9.0E-03 -6.2E-03 -0.02* -6.8E-03 -3.0E-03
(3.6E-03) (9.9E-03) (6.8E-03) (7.3E-03) (9.2E-03) (0.01) (9.2E-03)
No. Loans 9,327 1,112 2,594 2,752 1,040 613 1,216
No. Obs. 139,905 16,680 38,910 41,280 15,600 9,195 18,240
R2 0.03% 0.17% 0.01% 0.01% 0.25% 0.01% 0.10%
R̄2 0.03% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.23% -0.03% 0.07%
Bandwidth (h) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Cutoff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Results from local regression of merchants’ residuals of normalized daily transaction value as dependent
variable. Residuals are obtained by regressing normalized daily transaction value on day-of-the-week
dummies following Hausman and Rapson (2018). Daily transaction values are normalized by the
merchant’s average daily transaction value calculated in the 90-day period between 119 days and 30
days before loan disbursal (pre-disbursal long-term average sales). Regression uses number of days since
loan disbursal (day) as running variable. For detailed notes on regressions see Table 6. For detailed
definitions of samples see Table A1.
Significance: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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